Ea3gcha1 TRIAL UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4 13 CR 345(LGS) v. 5 ANTIONE CHAMBERS, 6 Defendant. -----x 7 8 New York, N.Y. October 3, 2014 9 9:00 a.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, 12 District Judge 13 14 APPEARANCES 15 PREET BHARARA 16 United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York 17 SANTOSH ARAVIND NEGAR TEKEEI 18 Assistant United States Attorneys 19 JOSHUA L. DRATEL WHITNEY SCHLIMBACH 20 Attorneys for Defendant 21 ALSO PRESENT: JOHN REYNOLDS, FBI JENNIFER HANSMA, Paralegal AUSA 22 SONIA FARBER, Law Clerk 23 24 25

(Trial resumed; jury not present) 1 THE COURT: I'm going to ask my law clerk to get the 2 3 charge and we'll do the charging conference first. I sent you both a blackline and a clean copy of the jury 4 5 instructions. Let's go page by page. Shall we use the blackline? 6 7 MR. DRATEL: I think, your Honor. THE COURT: Of course, the blackline does have page 8 9 numbers. Anything on page one? Let me ask the government. 10 What page is your first comment on? 11 MR. ARAVIND: My first comment is -- there's not many. 12 I just noticed a typo on page 12 of the actual charge, I'm 13 trying to find out where that is. 14 THE COURT: That's all right. I have the actual one 15 as well. Where is the typo? It's under the heading "an 16 agreement." 17 MR. ARAVIND: Above that, second line at the top of the page. It's "the commission of a robbery." 18 19 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Farber, if you search 20 "commission a robbery" it will come up. It should be 21 "commission of a robbery." 22 Is that your first page of comments? 23 MR. ARAVIND: Yes, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: That is under the elements of the offense 25 for robbery conspiracy, so in the draft --

MR. DRATEL: Page 23, 24. 1 THE COURT: Where is the next comment after that? 2 3 Yes, Mr. Dratel. 4 MR. DRATEL: We're preserving what we have already 5 done in terms of -- in other words, things that the Court has 6 eliminated or deleted, are they considered preserved so we 7 don't have to go through --THE COURT: Yes. 8 9 MR. DRATEL: Thank you. I'm just talking about things 10 as they stand right now -- sorry. 11 THE COURT: In other words, we obtained from the 12 government a proposed charge. We got from you a track changes 13 showing your proposed changes. Some of those were rejected. 14 Those objections are preserved. 15 MR. DRATEL: Thank you. So I'm just working on the 16 charge as it is? 17 THE COURT: As it is now. 18 MR. DRATEL: Correct. 19 THE COURT: Correct. 20 MR. ARAVIND: Your Honor, the next change I have is on 21 the blackline. It would be page 35. And this is the same 22 issue that we raised before related to the kidnapping, your 23 Honor. Since I think the evidence showed that both Mr. Barea 24 and Ms. Torruella were kidnapped, we would make a reference

there to individual or individuals or just individuals

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described in Count Three.

THE COURT: Actually, I don't think we need to reference -- why don't we go to the kidnapping charge, Count Three kidnapping charges the defendant with engaging in kidnapping. The following four elements: First --

MR. DRATEL: Which section are you in?

THE COURT: It's Count Three, kidnapping.

MR. DRATEL: Right.

THE COURT: It looks like -- it's impossible to tell the page numbers on the blackline.

MR. DRATEL: Tell me what section.

THE COURT: Sure. It's E, it says E, Count Three kidnapping.

MR. DRATEL: Okay.

THE COURT: We're going through the elements.

MR. DRATEL: Right.

THE COURT: What does the indictment -- actually I have the indictment, as well, but what does Count Three say? Did you intend that we give the jury a copy of the indictment?

MR. ARAVIND: We can certainly. I know we have done that in other cases. We would have to do a redacted version.

THE COURT: Let's not, unless you can have it redacted and done between now and then.

MR. ARAVIND: Of course, it depends on when the jury gets it, but we'll obviously work to get that done.

THE COURT: If it's ready, I will give it to them. 1 Ιf it's not, then I won't, but they have a very detailed 2 3 description of the charges in the charge. 4 MR. ARAVIND: Right. 5 THE COURT: It seems to me that that is sufficient. 6 But in any event, Mr. Dratel. 7 MR. DRATEL: The indictment is not evidence and an instruction to that without giving it to them --8 9 THE COURT: The model jury instructions include a 10 reference to giving them the indictment. I didn't see an 11 objection to that. 12 You can object to that if you want. 13 MR. DRATEL: We object. 14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. ARAVIND: Your Honor, the indictment does not 16 reference -- it just says Glisson and Chambers kidnapped an 17 individual, and that's in the "to wit" clause. I think the 18 evidence here is that two individuals were kidnapped. THE COURT: I think we can make this easier. 19 20 MR. ARAVIND: Sure. 21 THE COURT: In the indictment, there's no individual 22 named. 23 MR. ARAVIND: There's no individual named. 24 THE COURT: So let's say, first, the government must

prove the defendant seized or confined or kidnapped or inducted

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1 or carried away an individual.

MR. ARAVIND: Sure. That makes sense, your Honor.

THE COURT: Second, the government must prove that the defendant held an individual for ransom, reward or for reason. We can say "the." Let's make it "an." Third, the government must prove the individual was transported in interstate or foreign commerce. Let's keep that the same. Second, I think it should state "the" not "an."

Second, "the government must prove the defendant held the individual," and that just references what's in the prior sentence, which says "First, the government must prove the defendant seized or confined or kidnapped or an individual."

So the only change in that section is in the sentence that begins "first."

MR. ARAVIND: Yes. Of course, those changes should be then made to the rest of the substantive charges for kidnapping. I see the next change, it has to be in --

THE COURT: The first element.

MR. ARAVIND: Under first element, I would just say carried away "a" victim instead of "the" victim.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ARAVIND: The next one, under two, I think should be under two, the second element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the defendant held an individual for ransom or for some other reason. And then the next

1 sentence it should read --

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THE COURT: I would leave it as "the" in the next sentence so they know it's a reference to the preceding sentence.

MR. ARAVIND: That's fine. And then we can keep the "the" for the next line, the last line on that page.

THE COURT: Then in the last paragraph, "if you find that the defendant did not hold an individual," what about "for the reasons charged"?

MR. ARAVIND: I think it could read "for the purpose of carrying out a robbery of narcotics proceeds." I think that's what the indictment says.

So if we want to substitute that language, it's probably more specific, especially if the jury doesn't end up getting a copy of the indictment.

THE COURT: If you find that the defendant did not hold an individual and then delete described in three and then say four, what language did you want to insert?

MR. ARAVIND: For the purpose of carrying out a robbery of narcotics proceeds.

MR. DRATEL: Robbery of --

THE COURT: Narcotics proceeds.

MR. DRATEL: Which would be what's really referenced in Count Two as opposed to generic.

THE COURT: If we're not giving them the indictment.

MR. DRATEL: Okay.

THE COURT: If you find that the defendant did not hold an individual for the purpose of carrying out the robbery of narcotics proceeds or if you have reasonable doubt as to this element, then it is your duty to acquit on this count.

MR. ARAVIND: Then I think in the next -- under number three, the third element, I would suggest changing the first sentence to read the third element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that -- I think probably maybe a victim was transported in interstate commerce or a victim of the kidnapping was transported in interstate commerce.

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. DRATEL: No, your Honor.

MR. ARAVIND: Then in paragraph four, your Honor, the third paragraph, again, we would take out the reference to the individual described in Count Three and just say the defendant knew that a victim of the kidnapping was not with him voluntarily, but, rather, was forced or made to go with him.

THE COURT: Ms. Farber, I'll assume you'll tell me if it's not okay.

MS. FARBER: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Other comments?

MR. ARAVIND: Our next comment, your Honor, is in Count Four.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ARAVIND: The last line, it just says "or is guilty of the kidnapping conspiracy." Count Three does not charge a kidnapping conspiracy. It charges a substantive kidnapping. So I would just take out the in the conspiracy or just the conspiracy, yes.

THE COURT: We had a paragraph that starts "Count Four is a firearms count connected," is that right?

MR. ARAVIND: Yes. It should read connected to the robbery conspiracy charged in Count One and the kidnapping charged in Count Three. That means you cannot consider Count Four unless you first determine that the defendant is guilty of either the robbery conspiracy charged in Count One or is guilty of the kidnapping charged in Count Three.

THE COURT: So we're just deleting the word "conspiracy" there.

MR. ARAVIND: Correct.

THE COURT: All right. Other comments?

MR. ARAVIND: Your Honor, this may just be me trying to take out extraneous language, but I don't know whether you need to instruct them that a hammer is not a firearm.

THE COURT: That a hammer is not a firearm.

MR. ARAVIND: On 2A1.

THE COURT: There's language there that says, but a hammer is not a firearm.

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Do you have any objection to taking that out?

MR. DRATEL: No.

THE COURT: Ready for any other comments.

MR. ARAVIND: I don't think the government has any other comments.

THE COURT: Mr. Dratel, anything else?

MR. DRATEL: Your Honor, my first comment is in the identification instruction on the eyewitness identification instruction, page 29.

THE COURT: Are you in the clean copy?

MR. DRATEL: No. I'm working off of the redline, the blackline.

THE COURT: It says page nine.

MR. DRATEL: Twenty-nine. I'll look for it. I think it's about 40 or 41 -- page 40 in the --

THE COURT: In the clean copy.

MR. DRATEL: Yes. I think paragraph three, you have heard the arguments. I think "you will hear."

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DRATEL: Obviously, depending on the Court's ruling on some of the other issues, I think there should be additional information there of the type that's in the *Jones* opinion and about cross-racial identification, which complements the other types of factors this Court talked about back before.

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THE COURT: I asked the parties to give me a joint 1 2 proposal of a possible charge on that and I haven't received 3 anything. So, I'm not adverse to doing that, but I need 4 something specific. 5 MR. DRATEL: I'll have something. 6 THE COURT: Anything else? 7 MR. ARAVIND: Of course, we would have to look at that 8 proposed instruction. 9 THE COURT: Of course. 10 MR. ARAVIND: By my account, I think there's been one 11 or two references to any sort of cross-racial identification, 12 so we just want to look at what Mr. Dratel has. 13 THE COURT: Yes. 14 MR. DRATEL: My next comment is the blackline at 34 15 and the clean copy at 43 Section D, that first paragraph. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. DRATEL: I think that the order should be 18

reversed. I think that "if you find that the government has failed to meet its burden" should be before "you find that the government has met its burden."

THE COURT: Any objection?

MR. ARAVIND: We do object. It's our burden. I think that's our burden and that's why the sentence that talks about us meeting the burden should be first.

THE COURT: I agree with the government. I'll leave

it the way it is.

MR. DRATEL: Then at the bottom of that -- at the very end of that -- well, actually the paragraph that goes over to page 44, "then your good conscience appears to be in accordance with the truth," I'm not sure that that's the actual standard. I don't think that's the standard. I think really it's about the Court's instructions about what the law is, applying the facts to the law. They're supposed to --

THE COURT: I'm looking for the reference to conscience. I can't find it.

MR. DRATEL: If you look at page 44 of the clean copy, the paragraph that begins the page, the very last.

THE COURT: The runover paragraph.

MR. DRATEL: Yes, about the first full paragraph, the paragraph that carries over to 43, the last two lines.

THE COURT: Prejudice or favor of either party, and adopts the conclusion that in your good conscience appears to be in accordance with the truth.

MR. DRATEL: I think that undermines the burden of reasonable doubt as opposed to what's the truth, as opposed to holding the government to its burden.

MR. ARAVIND: There's a reference to the burden. We just spoke about the reference, which was in the first paragraph of that section.

I think one of the first things your Honor said to

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this jury was that this is a trial and it's a search for the truth, and I think that's true. So we believe that the Court's instructions is appropriate.

THE COURT: I agree with the government, so I'll keep it the way it is.

MR. DRATEL: And in the conclusion --

THE COURT: The closing comment.

MR. DRATEL: I'm just looking to see if it's actually -- the oath part, second line, "solely upon the evidence," I would just add "or lack of evidence."

THE COURT: I think that's argument. I'm going to leave it the way it is.

MR. DRATEL: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: With respect to the charge, Ms. Farber, if you email it to me, I can begin to charge them off of my iPad and then we can have copies made for the jury as I'm charging them. And as soon as they get here, we'll just catch them up to where it is.

Let's take a very brief recess so I can get some material out of the robing room.

I did have one question. There was a reference in one of the letters to counsel bringing a copy of the thumbnail picture today.

MR. DRATEL: Yes.

THE COURT: I was wondering where that is. I gathered

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it was in the 3500 material.

MR. DRATEL: Correct, but it was not identified in any way.

THE COURT: Ms. Farber, would you mind taking that from Mr. Dratel. I have 3500 material, and is it this picture?

THE COURT: It's the reverse side of the single photograph that was used in the photo array that's Defense Exhibit B, is that right?

MR. DRATEL: Okay.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DRATEL: Yes, that's right.

MR. DRATEL: Yes, your Honor.

MS. TEKEEI: Yes.

MR. DRATEL: Oh, I see. Yes.

MS. FARBER: On page 40, a point of clarification. struck "you have heard the argument by counsel on the subject", so to say "you will hear the arguments of counsel on the subject," it no longer makes sense to say "and I will not repeat them all here."

MR. DRATEL: Right.

THE COURT: I have your copy of this, I'll give it back. I understand now what it is.

What is the government's understanding of when that was shown to Ms. Torres?

MS. TEKEEI: We don't know that it was. When looking

at this in the 3500, we actually didn't think that this was Mr. Chambers.

THE COURT: Let me ask this question. I'll ask a different question.

MS. TEKEEI: Sure.

THE COURT: When the witness talked about a single photo that was shown on the computer enlarged, which occasion did you think that was? Which photo and when in the sequence?

MS. TEKEEI: Honestly, we were completely confused by it and were not sure and still remain unsure. And we have spent a bulk of last night looking through the materials to see what it could possibly have been. We really don't know. It was the very first time that we heard anything like that. We looked through the 3500 materials just to verify that in case for some reason something had slipped. Of course, we would have notified Mr. Dratel and the Court had we known.

At this moment, we remain confused by that testimony. We're not sure.

THE COURT: I understand. I accept your representation.

Let me ask Mr. Dratel what he thinks when in the sequence the single photograph was displayed to the witness, or do you agree that it's somewhat unclear that it was certainly before the Internet photo?

MR. DRATEL: If there's any lack of clarity is because

Detective Deloren never memorialized that, he never told the government.

THE COURT: I understand that. I had a simple question what your theory was. I think the evidence is ambiguous on that question, but I was just curious what your theory, is if you have one. Your theory may be it's ambiguous.

MR. DRATEL: I think that the first photo she saw was a single photo of him and maybe that thumbnail, that he describes as a thumbnail in his 3500 from two days ago, not never before, that that's the younger photo that she talks about. And then the array --

THE COURT: I'm going to interrupt you because I think all this is sort of academic in a sense because we're now trying to interpret the testimony. The testimony is what it is. So excuse me just a moment, I'll be back.

(Recess)

THE COURT: You may be seated.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}.$  DRATEL: One other thing has come to my attention just now.

THE COURT: Speak into the mic.

MR. DRATEL: Sorry. Respectfully, that photo that I just gave to the Court this morning was on Agent Reynold's phone at the time he arrested Mr. Chambers and showed it to Mr. Chambers on the car ride on the way back from New Jersey.

THE COURT: I'm sorry to be obtuse, but the

significance of that is?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  DRATEL: Detective Deloren said he had no idea where the photo came from.

THE COURT: I see. I hadn't realized that Detective Deloren had said that.

MR. DRATEL: But also that's a photo that's out there, being used.

THE COURT: All right. So, I'm prepared to rule on the motion to strike Ms. Torres' testimony.

Let me read the ruling.

This is the fourth time I've been asked to rule on whether or not the identification procedures used to identify Mr. Chambers were unduly suggestive. Unlike the first three times, and based on Ms. Torres' testimony, I'm granting Mr. Chambers' motion to strike. I intend to ask the jury to disregard all of Ms. Torres' testimony identifying Mr. Chambers, including her in-court identification.

Let me briefly review the history of this motion.

Initially, Mr. Chambers made a motion to suppress the identification testimony on the ground that the victims were shown two photo arrays, both containing a photo of Mr. Chambers, the second of which resulted in a positive identification. I held that while the procedure was suggestive, it did not rise to a constitutional violation and denied the motion. Second, several months later, the

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government wrote to advise that they had just learned that one of the victims, whom we now know to be Ms. Torres, was also shown a single candid photo of the defendant from the Patriot News website Mr. Chambers' full name under the picture, that she had been unable to identify Mr. Chambers as the perpetrator from this candid photo, and was only able to identify him from a second photo array. I again denied the motion on the same grounds.

Third, on the Monday the beginning of trial, I deny Mr. Chambers' motion for a Wade hearing based on another revelation, this time in the 3500 materials, that Ms. Torres had Googled Mr. Chambers after Detective Deloren showed her the online picture and, quote, "saw same photo in article - nothing different than when saw it" at the precinct. The basis for my ruling as I explained on Tuesday, was that quote "[s]ince the witness was looking again at the same photo on the same day, that additional viewing did not...materially change the analysis of my prior ruling." Over the course of Detective Deloren and Ms. Torres' testimony, it's become clear to me that the facts are yet again different from what had been represented to the Court, and apparently to the prosecutors as well.

With regard to Ms. Torres' testimony, which I found to be credible, my understanding of the timeline for the identification of Mr. Chambers is as follows, but the precise

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sequence admittedly is not entirely clear. Ms. Torres met with Detective Deloren on four different occasions to identify the person she saw in her grandmother's living room on the night of the robbery. She first met with Detective Deloren "a day or two after the night" (135,11). Detective Deloren showed her mug shot photos on the computer at the precinct (142,22). identifications resulted from this first visit.

The second time Ms. Torres met with Detective Deloren, a few months later, he showed her a single photo of Mr. Chambers on his computer screen at the precinct. Ms. Torres told Detective Deloren that the person in the picture looked a little younger and could be the person from the night of the robbery. Ms. Torres testified that this picture was not the same as any of the other pictures entered as exhibits by either side in the trial. She said about her identification, her viewing of the photo at the time in the precinct, quote, "I didn't pick one and he clicked it. It was already opened that one." [166:5-6]

Ms. Torres also testified that she failed to identify Mr. Chambers from the same array that her mother Ms. Torruella had failed to identify him from. Based on my review of the testimony, however, it remains unclear whether this happened before or after she was shown the single photo on the screen.

The third time Detective Deloren called Ms. Torres into the precinct to show her what he called, quote, "an

updated picture" of the same person. He showed her the picture from the Patriot News website, which included the name "Antione Chambers" under the photo. In the picture, Mr. Chambers is shown wearing a hat. Ms. Torres, who testified that the perpetrator had been wearing a hat at the time of her initial viewing, stated that the single photo convinced her that Mr. Chambers was person she saw the night of the robbery.

When Ms. Torres returned home, she went online and found the same news article on her computer. She then saw not just one picture of Mr. Chambers, the one that Detective Deloren had shown her, but three additional pictures of him associated with the same news story. In each picture, Mr. Chambers is shown wearing a hat.

Finally, Detective Deloren met with Ms. Torres a fourth time, which is when she identified Mr. Chambers from the array that is now Government Exhibit 1001. Based on this sequence of events, Ms. Torres identified Mr. Chambers in court.

With regard to Detective Deloren to the extent that his account differs, I do not find it credible. This is for several reasons. First, the facts of the identification procedure had been constantly evolving, resulting in now four separate motions to quash the identification testimony.

Second, Detective Deloren failed to make any kind of record of the two most suggestive occasions when he showed Ms. Torres

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photos of Mr. Chambers - when he showed her the single photo I did not learn about until the testimony; and when he showed her the Internet candid photo. Third, when on cross, it was suggested that Detective Deloren had intended to conceal that he had shown Ms. Torres the Internet photo, he insisted the that he had told the prosecutors and FBI about showing Ms. Torres the Internet photo Mr. Chambers around the time she viewed it, and in any event, much closer to May 2013 than January 2013. This statement is directly contrary to the government's written representation to the Court in February 2014 that they had just learned about the online newspaper photo. The government, as it is ethically required to do, corrected Detective Deloren's testimony by stipulation now in evidence, stating that they did not know about the Internet photo until January 24, 2014. It appears that they first learned about the Internet photo, not from Detective Deloren, but rather from when they interviewed Ms. Torres.

With regard to the facts underlying my ruling, there are significant differences between the factual account which were the basis for my prior rulings and the current evidence.

First, Ms. Torres met with Detective Deloren on four or five occasion and not three. Second, she was shown another single photo of Mr. Chambers that we learned about during her testimony. Third, she was not shown the photo from the news article on the same day that she was shown the initial array.

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Fourth, she first identified Mr. Chambers from the single photograph from the online article, rather than from the final array. And fifth, she saw three additional pictures of Mr. Chambers online before the final array and the, quote, "official" positive identification.

The government argues that I should hold a Wade hearing to assess whether the identification techniques were unduly suggestive. I reject this suggestion. Quote, "The purpose of a Wade hearing is to determine before trial whether pretrial identification procedures had been so improperly suggestive as to taint an in-court identification." Lynn v. Bliden, 443 F.3d 238, 248, (2d Cir. 2006), as amended (May 19, There is no need for a Wade hearing as I have already 2006). heard testimony and seen evidence about the identification procedures at trial and considered the "totality of circumstances." I have determined that Detective Deloren has not given a credible account and that Ms. Torres has. All parties were on notice that the identity of the defendant is the single material issue at this trial, and the government had and took the opportunity to put on its evidence on that issue. Moreover, the government opposed a Wade hearing earlier this week when defense counsel requested it. Finally, the government has not pointed to any case, and I have not found any, where a Wade hearing is held about the evidence after it has been presented at trial, indeed after the government has

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rested.

So with regard to my ruling about striking the testimony, as I have explained, due process requires that in order to protect a defendant's fundamental right to a fair trial, identification procedures employed by law enforcement must not be "so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).

(Continued on next page)

THE COURT: Further, single-photo identifications are generally disfavored as unduly suggestive. See <u>United States</u>

<u>v. Concepcion</u>, 983 F.2d 369, 377 (2d Cir. 1992).

In determining whether the procedures in this case were impermissibly suggested, I first have to decide whether or not the identification was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to mistaken identification that Mr. Chambers was denied due process. Stoval v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). I am required to "examine the procedures employed in light of the particular facts of the case and the totality of the surrounding circumstances." United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 808 (2d Cir. 1994).

Having reviewed the identification process in light of the particular facts and the totality of the circumstances, I find that the photo identifications and surrounding circumstances were unduly suggestive and conducive to misidentification. Ms. Torres was shown single photos of Mr. Chambers on two separate occasions, and in each case the detective made clear that the subject of the photograph was his target. There seems to be little other reason to show a "updated" photograph rather than an array. My initial rulings were predicated on the belief that we were dealing with two arrays and an intervening single photograph. Now I find that we are actually dealing with only one final array preceded by at least five individual photographs and the detective's, at

the very least, implicit encouragement. Further, the only photographs in which she viewed anyone wearing a hat were the ones of the defendant that came from the online article that Detective Deloren had shown her. Ms. Torres testified that the perpetrator had worn a hat and that when she viewed any photo, she covered the hairline with her hand. I also conclude that the various photos of Mr. Chambers from the online article more closely resemble his picture in the final array than the single photo in the multiple arrays. In the words of Judge Vincent Broderick of this district, "this evidence leads me to find that the procedures, to put it most charitably, were 'impermissibly suggestive.'" Jackson v. Fogg, 465 F.Supp. 177, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) aff'd 589 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1978).

Even "if the pretrial procedures have been unduly suggestive, an in-court identification may still be permitted if the Court determines that the identification is independently reliable. The factors to be considered in assessing reliability include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Thai, 29 F.3d at 808.

Further, "the factors must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances, recognizing that the linchpin of

admissibility is reliability, "id. and a "good or poor rating with respect to any of these factors will generally not be dispositive, Raheem v. Kelly, 257 F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2001).

Evaluating the facts in light of the totality of the circumstances, I do not find that Ms. Torres' identifications were independently reliable. She testified that at the time of her initial viewing the perpetrator was standing in the living room, while she stood in the hallway at the door. The only light came from the stove light of the kitchen, which was on low, and the hallway light. No lights were on in the living room. She stated that the distance between her and the perpetrator was about the length of the entire jury box. She also testified that the perpetrator kept looking away.

Finally, her viewing lasted no more than a few minutes. Even if I were to credit Ms. Torres' degree of attention, I cannot conclude that such attention aided her identification, given the circumstances of the viewing.

It is true that "a suggestive procedure does not in itself intrude upon a constitutionally protected interest if it did not contribute significantly to the identification of the defendant." Raheem, 275 F.3d at 135. In this case, however, I find that the suggestive procedures did significantly contribute to the identification of the defendant. I am therefore unable to conclude that any indicia of independent reliability in Ms. Torres' identification are sufficient to

outweigh the "corrupting effect of the suggestiveness."

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"A witness who makes an out-of-court identification in unduly suggestive circumstances may perform an in-court identification only if the government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification rests on an independent source." <u>United States v. Ghayth</u>, 990 F.Supp.2d 427, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In making the determination as to whether the in-court identification "rested on an independent recollection of the victim's initial encounter with the assailant, uninfluenced by the pretrial identifications, courts consider the following factors: 1, the victim's prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act; (2) any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant's actual description; (3) any identification prior to the procedure of another person; (4) a photographic identification of the defendant prior to the illegal procedure; (5) the victim's failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion; and (6) the lapse of time between the alleged act and the tainted identification. Young v. Conway, 698 F.3d 69, 78 (2d Cir. 2012).

Here, based on the evidence presented at trial, the government has failed to meet its burden. As I have discussed, Ms. Torres' prior opportunity to observe the perpetrator was brief and in bad light. In addition to the factors I have already discussed, Ms. Torres initially thought that the

perpetrator looked like her friend's boyfriend. Further, she described a mark on the perpetrator's face, one Mr. Chambers does not have. In addition, Ms. Torres failed to identify at least one photo of Mr. Chambers and explain that he looked younger. Ms. Torres has never identified Mr. Chambers without the taint of impermissible suggestiveness. Consequently, her in-court identification cannot stand.

In sum, I grant Mr. Chambers' motion to strike. The Second Circuit "generally presumes the juries limiting instructions." <u>United States v. Gomez</u>, 617 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 2010). The presumption is dropped where there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the Court's instruction and the evidence is devastating to the defense. I do not find that the eyewitness evidence that Ms. Torres offered was so devastating that the jury will be unable to follow a curative instruction. Therefore, I find that a curative instruction to the jury to disregard Ms. Torres' identification evidence is an appropriate remedy, and that a mistrial is not warranted.

After striking Ms. Torres' eyewitness testimony and given that I based my decision to allow expert testimony on the matter based on the procedures used in Ms. Torres' case, any expert testimony on eyewitness identification should not be admitted.

That's my ruling. I intend to give a simple

instruction to strike. I will also ask that the government exhibit, which is the final photo array, be struck from the evidence. And my question to the defense is whether or not you would like to withdraw Exhibits B and C.

MR. DRATEL: And I think A as well. Because I think that's the article itself.

THE COURT: A.

MR. DRATEL: A is the article, B is the array, C is the other photographs from the Internet article.

THE COURT: And the government exhibit is 1000 or 1001?

MS. TEKEEI: 1001, your Honor.

THE COURT: We will need to get those out of the jury's notebooks, Mr. Street.

Yes, Mr. Dratel.

MR. DRATEL: Given the Court's ruling, defense would rest and renew our Rule 29 motions.

THE COURT: The motion is denied for the same reasons that I discussed yesterday, as I did not take into account, as I said, the identifications in making my ruling.

I think you may want to rest when the jury comes out.

MR. ARAVIND: Before we do that, your Honor, just two issues related to the stipulations.

The first is we do have now a typed-up version of the Internet photo stip related to the testimony, the showing of the photograph, Internet photograph of Mr. Chambers by

Detective Deloren to Ms. Torres which we will hand up once it's signed by Mr. Dratel.

And then we noticed yesterday that one of the parties' stipulations that related to the cell site evidence had a typo in paragraph 7 and so we would ask that this amended stipulation be substituted in for that stipulation, and Mr. Dratel has signed it.

THE COURT: How do the logistics of the notebook work with these changes? I don't have any problem with our doing it.

MR. ARAVIND: We will scan it in and send it to them or bring it to court as soon --

THE COURT: Okay.

Mr. Dratel.

MR. DRATEL: Just before the jury comes out,
Dr. Strange is in the hall. I would like to let her go. I
think Detective Deloren is out there, too.

One question with respect -- I don't know the government's position because I just realized it. The expert testimony instruction. I don't think the government ever qualified Agent Perry as an expert. I don't know that there is any expert testimony in the case. I am not going to challenge his testimony in terms of competence because just as a person of knowledge and training, he was able to testify.

THE COURT: I think his testimony was in the nature of expert testimony. And the instruction, as I recall it, basically says, you know, don't give extra --

MR. DRATEL: I think your Honor is right.

MR. ARAVIND: Your Honor, can we just have one moment to just cover with our chief?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. ARAVIND: Your Honor, just for the record, we are obviously abiding by the Court's ruling. We just wanted to note that it's the government's view that the Court does have discretion to reopen a hearing on the issue about the pretrial identification procedures and to permit Detective Deloren to testify to achieve the totality of the circumstances that I think the Second Circuit says this Court should be looking at in evaluating this issue. But we obviously are abiding by the ruling and we will tailor our arguments in summation accordingly.

THE COURT: Thank you.

And just as a note, I did not mention in my ruling Mr. Dratel's argument about Detective Deloren selecting the photos for the photo array. It seemed to me that that was not really one of the big issues in my own mind, and so I didn't think that having additional testimony on that would necessarily be helpful or instructive.

MR. ARAVIND: We do have a very quick question for

your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. ARAVIND: This ruling, we understand it is about Ms. Torres' eyewitness identification. There hasn't been any statement with respect to Ms. Torruella's. And I believe the photo array that was shown to her that was admitted into evidence remains in evidence, and we can make reference to it in summation, as I expect Mr. Dratel would make references to the identification and lack of identification in his submission.

THE COURT: Mr. Dratel.

MR. DRATEL: Yes, your Honor.

Also, I'll withdraw my request to amend the identification instruction.

THE COURT: I think where we are is that I will give the instruction to strike and I will then give the charge.

Then we will have closing arguments. My guess is closing arguments will be after lunch. The charge is long.

MR. DRATEL: Even if the Court's charge ends, my guess is at this point probably end somewhere around noon, if we break early and come back and do the summations.

THE COURT: I would do that. I will not begin summations and have a little bit of one and then break or even have one and then break. I'll do them in a piece.

MR. ARAVIND: Your Honor, because my review of the

transcript yesterday — this is about the phone stipulation. So the issue was the reference to the Sprint records. The stipulation that was read into the record indicated that I believe all voice communications are recorded in the central time zone. The actual stipulation should read that Sprint reports times of voice calls in the local time zone in which the voice is placed and records text messages in the central time zone. That's consistent with what Special Agent Reynolds and Special Agent Perry testified to. We would ask that the Court just read that paragraph to correct the record, which is paragraph 7 of Government Exhibit 2001.

THE COURT: If you put a sticky next to it to avoid any possible error on my part, I appreciate that.

MR. ARAVIND: Your Honor, if we could just get a preview of what instruction you are going to give.

THE COURT: I am trying to get it to give you.

MR. ARAVIND: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: Let me read to you what I intend to say. If you have any comments, I welcome them.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, as I informed you at the beginning of the trial, you must disregard any evidence that I strike from the record. I will now instruct you that I'm striking the testimony of Ms. Torres that relates to her identification of the defendant, including her in-court identification that you witnessed.

I'm also striking exhibits relating to that identification which are Government Exhibits 1001 and Defendant's Exhibits A, B, and C.

It is your duty to disregard the evidence I have just spoken about in your deliberations. That means you are not to discuss the evidence and you are to deliberate as though the testimony of Ms. Torres relating to the identification of the defendant did not occur. It should not play any role in your verdict.

MR. ARAVIND: That's fine with the government.

MR. DRATEL: That's fine.

THE COURT: Mr. Street, as soon as you are done doing that, if you can bring the jury in.

Mr. Dratel, the first thing I'll do when they come out is look at you and you can say the defense rests.

MR. DRATEL: Yes.

THE COURT: Let me strike the testimony and then you can rest.

MR. DRATEL: Thank you.

THE COURT: Counsel, we have copies of the jury instructions for you, but they are printing. The jury does have theirs. As soon as they are done, I will give them to you.

MS. TEKEEI: Thank you.

MR. DRATEL: Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Street, I think we are ready.

(Jury present)

THE COURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My sincere apologies for the delay. But I promise you that that will not happen again. I'm confident.

Here is what I would like to do. The first thing is that there is an amended stipulation that's Government Exhibit 2001. It's the stipulation that dealt with the phone records. And one paragraph is amended. And so I will just read that amended paragraph and I'll read it in its entirety. It's paragraph 7 and it has to do with toll record custodians.

It says: If called to testify, a custodian of records from Sprint would testify as follows: A. He or she is familiar with the recording keeping practices of Sprint; B. In the toll records Sprint records times of voice calls in the local time zone in which the voice call is placed; and C. Sprint records text messages in the central time zone.

I will give this to Mr. Street.

I also have an instruction for you.

Ladies and gentlemen, as I informed you at the beginning of trial, you must disregard any evidence that I strike from the record. I will now instruct you that I am striking the testimony of Ms. Torres. That's Ms. Torruella's daughter who you heard testify a couple of days ago that relates to her identification of the defendant, including her

in-court identification that you witnessed.

I'm also striking exhibits relating to that identification, which are Government Exhibit 1001 and Defendant's Exhibits A, B, and C. It is your duty to disregard the evidence that I have just spoken about in your deliberations. This means that you are not to discuss the evidence and you are to deliberate as though the testimony of Ms. Torres relating to identification of the defendant did not occur. It should not play any role in your verdict.

Now I think we were headed to the defense case. As I told you, the defense is not required to present a case. The defendant is presumed innocent. The burden of proof is on the government to prove its case.

Having said that, Mr. Dratel, would you like to put on any witnesses or evidence?

MR. DRATEL: No. Thank you, your Honor. The defense rests.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, at this time I'm now going to give you the final substantive instructions for what you need to do when you deliberate. After I give you the instructions you'll hear final arguments from the lawyers. And after that I'll have a few closing remarks and then you'll go off to the jury room to deliberate.

You have copies of the jury instructions in front of you. You will be allowed to take them into the jury room with

you. If you wish to follow along while I read, you may. It you prefer just to listen, you may do that as well.

Members of the jury, you've now heard all of the evidence in the case, as well as the final arguments of the parties. We have reached the point where you are about to undertake your final function as jurors. You have paid careful attention to the evidence and I am confident that you will act together, with fairness and impartiality, to reach a just verdict in this case.

My duty at this point is to instruct you as to the law. It is your duty to accept these instructions of law and apply them to the facts as you determine them, just as it has been my duty to preside over the trial and decide what testimony and evidence was proper under the law for your consideration.

On these legal matters, you must take the law as I give it to you. If any attorney or witness has stated a different principle different from what I state to you in my instructions, it is my instructions you must follow.

You are to consider these instructions together as a whole, in other words, you are not to isolate or give undue weight to any particular instruction.

So the heading I'm at is role of the jury, in case you are trying to follow along.

As members of the jury you are the sole and exclusive

judges of the facts. You pass upon the evidence, you determine the credibility of witnesses, you resolve the conflicts as there may be in the testimony, you draw whatever reasonable inferences you decide to draw from the facts as you have determined them, and you determine the weight of the evidence or lack of evidence.

It is your sworn duty and you have taken the oath as jurors to determine the facts and to follow the law as I give it to you. You must not substitute your own notions or opinions of what the law is or ought to be.

I remind you that in reaching your verdict you are to perform your duty of finding the facts without bias or prejudice as to any party. You must remember that all parties stand as equals before a jury in the courts of the United States. You must also remember that it would be improper for you to allow any feelings you might have about the nature of the crimes charged to interfere with your decision making process.

The fact that the prosecution is brought in the name of the United States does not entitle the government or its witnesses to any greater consideration than that accorded to any other party. By the same token, the government is entitled to no less consideration. The government and the defendant stand as equals at the bar of justice. Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence or the lack of evidence.

Now I will instruct you on the presumption of innocence and the government's burden of proof in this case. The defendant has pleaded not guilty. In so doing he has denied every allegation against him. As a result of the defendant's plea of not guilty, the burden is on the prosecution to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to the defendant for the simple reason that the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witness or producing any evidence.

The law presumes the defendant to be innocent of all charges against him. I, therefore, instruct you that the defendant is to be presumed by you to be innocent throughout your deliberations.

The defendant began the trial here with a clean slate. This presumption of innocence alone is sufficient to acquit the defendant unless you as jurors are unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, after a careful and impartial consideration of all of the evidence in the case. If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden as to the defendant, then you must find the defendant not guilty. This presumption was with the defendant when the trial began, remains with him even now as I speak to you, and will continue with him during your deliberations unless and until you are convinced that the prosecution has proven him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.

Now, the next question is, what is reasonable doubt?

It is doubt that a reasonable person has after carefully weighing all of the evidence or doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in a matter of importance in his or her own personal life. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs.

In a criminal case, the burden is at all times upon the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The law does not require that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; rather, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is sufficient to convict. The burden never shifts to the defendant, which means that it is always the prosecution's burden to prove each of the elements of the crimes charged against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.

If, after a fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or the lack of evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to the count you are considering as to the defendant, then you must acquit the defendant on that count. On the other hand, if after fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence you are satisfied of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant.

In determining the facts, you must rely upon your own

recollection of the evidence. Evidence consists of the testimony of witnesses, the exhibits that have been received, and the stipulations of the parties that I've read to you.

The statements and arguments made by the lawyers are not evidence. Their arguments are intended to convince you what conclusions you should draw from the evidence or lack of evidence. You should weigh and evaluate the lawyers' argument carefully, but you must not confuse them with the evidence. As to the evidence presented at trial, it is your recollection that governs, not the statements of the lawyers.

You should also bear in mind that a question put to a witness is never evidence. It is the answer to the question that is evidence. However, if a witness affirms the facts in a question by answering yes, you may consider the facts in that question to be evidence. Another exception to this is you may not consider any answer that I directed you to disregard or that I ordered to be stricken from the record.

Next I'll talk about direct and circumstantial evidence.

There are two types of evidence that you may properly use in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the crimes with which he is charged. One type of evidence is called direct evidence. Direct evidence of a fact in issue is presented when a witness testifies to that fact based on what he or she personally saw, heard, or observed. In other

words, what a witness testifies about a fact in issue on the basis of that witness' own knowledge by virtue of what he or she feels, sees, touches, or hears, that is direct evidence.

The second type of evidence is circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that tends to prove a disputed fact indirectly by proof of other facts.

There is a simple example of circumstantial evidence that I gave you on the first day of trial and I'll repeat it now.

Assume that when you came into the courtroom this morning the sun was shining and it was a nice day outdoors. Assume that the courtroom shades were drawn and you could not look outside. Assume further that as you were sitting here someone walked in with an umbrella that was dripping wet and then a few minutes later somebody else walked in with a raincoat that was also dripping wet.

Now, because you could not look outside the courtroom and you could not see whether it was raining, you would have no direct evidence of that fact. But on the combination of facts that I have asked you to assume it would be reasonable and logical for you to conclude that it was raining. That's all there is to circumstantial evidence. You infer on the basis of your reason, experience, and common sense from one established fact the existence or nonexistence of some other fact.

Drawing inferences is not the same as guesswork or speculation. An inference is a logical, factual conclusion

that you might reasonably draw from other facts that have been proven. It is sometimes difficult to prove material facts such as state of mind by direct evidence. Usually such facts are established by circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences you draw. Circumstantial evidence may be given as much weight as direct evidence.

You should draw no inference or conclusion for or against any party on the basis of the lawyers' objections or my rulings on any objections. Counsel have a right and duty to make legal objections. Nothing I say is evidence. If I commented on the evidence at any time, do not accept any statements in place of your recollection or your interpretation. It is your recollection and interpretation that govern.

Also, do not draw any inference from any of my rulings which do not indicate any view on my part. You should not speculate on what I may think.

Further, do not concern yourself with what was said at side bar conferences or during my discussions with counsel.

Those discussions related to rulings of law.

At times I may have admonished a witness or directed a witness to be responsive to questions or to keep his or her voice up. At times I asked a question myself. Any questions that I asked, or instructions that I gave, were intended only to clarify the presentation of the evidence. You should draw

no inference or conclusion of any kind, favorable or unfavorable, with respect to any comment, question, or instruction of mine. Nor should you infer that I have any views as to the credibility of any witness, the weight of the evidence, or how you should decide any issue that is before you. That is your role.

Finally, the personalities and conduct of counsel are not in any way at issue. If you formed conclusions of any kind about any lawyer in the case, favorable or unfavorable, those opinions should not enter into your deliberations.

I am going to give you a few general instructions as to how you may determine whether witnesses are credible and reliable and whether the witness has told the truth at this trial. It's really just a matter of using your common sense, your judgment, and your experience. First, consider how well the witness was able to observe or hear what he or she testified about. The witness may be honest but mistaken. How did the witness' testimony impress you? Did the witness appear to be testifying honestly or candidly? Were the witness' answers direct or were they evasive? Consider the way the witness acted, his or her way of testifying, and the strength and accuracy of his or her recollection. Consider whether any outside factors might have affected a witness' ability to perceive events.

Consider the substance of the testimony. How does the

witness' testimony compare with other proof in the case? Is it corroborated or is it contradicted by other evidence? If there is a conflict, does any version appear reliable, and, if so, which version seems more reliable?

In addition, you may consider whether a witness had any possible bias or relationship with a party or any possible interest in the outcome of the case. Such a bias or relationship does not necessarily make the witness unworthy of belief. These are simply factors that you may consider.

If a witness made statements in the past that are inconsistent with his or her testimony during the trial concerning facts that are at issue here, you may consider that fact in deciding how much of the testimony, if any, to believe. In making this determination, you may consider whether the witness purposely made a false statement or whether it was an innocent mistake. You may also consider whether the inconsistency concerns an important fact or merely a small detail, as well as whether the witness had an explanation for the inconsistency and, if so, whether that explanation appealed to your common sense.

If you find that a witness has testified falsely as to any material fact or if you find that a witness has been previously untruthful when testifying under oath or otherwise, you may reject that witness' testimony in its entirety or you may accept only those parts that you believe to be truthful or

that are corroborated by other independent evidence in the case.

Under your oath as jurors you are not to be swayed by sympathy. You are to be guided solely by the evidence in this case in determining whether the prosecution has proved the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

It is for you, and you alone, to decide whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged solely on the basis of the evidence and subject to the law as I have instructed you. It must be clear to you that if you let fear, prejudice, bias, or sympathy interfere with your thinking, there is a risk that you will not arrive at a true and just verdict.

If you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt on a charge, then you must render a verdict of acquittal on that charge against the defendant. On the other hand, if you find that the prosecution has met its burden of proving the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to a particular count, then you should not hesitate because of sympathy or any other reason to render a verdict of guilty on that charge.

I also caution you that under your oath as jurors you cannot consider as part of your deliberations the punishment that may be imposed upon the defendant if he is convicted. The duty of imposing punishment rests exclusively upon the Court.

Your verdict must be unanimous with respect to each count. Each juror is entitled to his or her opinion, but you are required to exchange views with your fellow jurors and discuss the evidence. If you have a point of view and your discussion with other jurors changes your mind on a particular point, you may change your mind if you are convinced that the opposite point of view is really one that satisfies your judgment and conscience. You must not change your mind simply reply because you are outnumbered or outweighed. You should vote with the others only if you are convinced on the evidence, facts, and the law that it is the correct way to decide the case.

Remember at all times, you are not partisans. You are judges, judges of the facts. Your sole interest is to seek the truth from the evidence in the case. I will say a little bit more about your duties in deliberating after the closing arguments.

Let me turn now to the substantive instructions. The defendant is formally charged in an indictment. The indictment is merely a charge or accusation. It is not evidence and it does not prove or even indicate guilt. As a result, you are to give it no weight in deciding the defendant's guilt or nonguilt. What matters is the evidence you've heard at trial. The defendant is presumed innocent and it is the prosecution's burden to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.

The indictment in this case contains four counts.

Each count charges a separate offense or crime. You must,

therefore, consider each count separately and you must return a
separate verdict on each count.

Count One of the indictment charges that in or about March 2013, Antione Chambers conspired or agreed with others to commit a robbery of an individual believed to be in possession of money from drugs in the Bronx, New York.

Count Two of the indictment charges that on or about March 25, 2013, Antione Chambers committed a robbery of an individual believed to be in possession of money from drugs in the Bronx, New York.

Count Three of the indictment charges that on or about March 25, 2013, Antione Chambers and others kidnapped an individual for the purpose of carrying out a robbery of money for drugs.

Count Four of the indictment charges that on March 25, 2013, Antione Chambers, during and in relation to a conspiracy to commit robbery or kidnapping, knowingly did use and carry a firearm and in furtherance of such crime did possess a firearm and did aid and abet the use, carrying, and possession of a firearm which was brandished.

Count One: Robbery conspiracy.

The first count of the indictment charges that the

defendant violated Section 1951 of Title 18 of the United States Code. That section provides: Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce for the movement of any article or commodity in commerce by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be guilty of a crime.

Specifically, Count One charges a conspiracy to commit armed robbery. A conspiracy is a kind of criminal partnership, an agreement of two or more persons to join together to accomplish some unlawful purpose.

The crime of conspiracy to commit robbery is an independent offense, separate and distinct from an actual robbery. You may find the defendant guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit robbery, even if the conspiracy was not successful and there was no actual robbery committed.

To meet the burden of proving the robbery conspiracy charged in Count One, the prosecution must prove two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, the prosecution must prove the existence of the robbery conspiracy charged in Count One; and

Second, the prosecution must prove that the defendant knowingly and unlawfully became a member of the conspiracy.

I'll talk about each of these elements in depth now.

The first element is the existence of a conspiracy that had as its object the illegal purpose charged in the indictment. A conspiracy is a combination, agreement, or understanding of two or more persons to accomplish by concerted action a criminal or unlawful purpose. The unlawful purpose alleged to have been the object of the conspiracy charged in Count One is the commission of a robbery.

The gist of the crime of conspiracy is an unlawful agreement between two or more people to violate the law. The first element of the crime of conspiracy has two parts: (1) an agreement and (2) an illegal object of the conspiracy. I am now going to describe both parties of this element to you.

First, an agreement.

First, to meet its burden of proof on this element, the prosecution must prove that there was an agreement, meaning that two or more people in some way or manner came to an understanding, either spoken or unspoken, to violate the law. However, the prosecution is not required to show that two or more people sat down around a table and entered into a solemn pact, stating that they had formed a conspiracy to violate the law and spelling out all the details of the plan, or the part that each of the persons who was a party to the conspiracy was going to play.

Common sense will tell you that when people, in fact, undertake to enter into a criminal conspiracy, much is left to

the unexpressed understanding. By its very nature, a conspiracy is almost always secret.

When people enter into a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful end, they become agents or partners of one another in carrying out the conspiracy. In determining the factual issues before you, you may take into account against the defendant any acts done or statements made by any of the alleged coconspirators during the course of the conspiracy. And any inferences that can be drawn from those acts or statements, even though such acts or statements were not made in the presence of the defendant or were made without his knowledge. Sometimes, the only evidence that is available is that of disconnected acts that, when taken together in connection with one another, show a conspiracy or an agreement to secure a particular result just as satisfactorily and conclusively as more direct proof.

It is sufficient to establish the existence of the conspiracy if, after considering all of the relevant evidence, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the minds of at least two alleged conspirators met in an understanding way, and that they agreed, as I've explained, to work together to accomplish the object or objective of the conspiracy charged in Count One.

The second part of the first element relates to the object or objective of the conspiracy. Count One of the indictment charges that the object of the conspiracy was to

commit robbery and specifically a robbery that would and did obstruct, delay, and affect commerce and the movement of articles and commodities in commerce.

Later, when I explain Count Two, which is the substantive crime corresponding to the objective of conspiracy charged in Count One, I will explain the elements of the robbery charge.

Turning now to the second element, if you conclude that the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy charged in the indictment existed and that the conspiracy had as its object the illegal purpose charged in the indictment, then you must next determine the second question, whether the defendant participated in the conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful purpose and in furtherance of its unlawful objective.

The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully and knowingly entered into the conspiracy, that is, with a purpose to violate the law, and that the defendant agreed to take part in the conspiracy to promote and cooperate in its unlawful objective.

The terms unlawfully and knowingly are used because, if you find that the defendant did join the conspiracy, you must also consider whether the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that in doing so the defendant knew what he was doing. In other words, the government must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant joined the conspiracy deliberately and voluntarily.

Unlawfully simply means contrary to law. The defendant need not have known that he was breaking any particular law, but he must have been aware of the generally unlawful nature of his acts.

An act is done knowingly is it is done deliberately and purposely, that is, the defendant's acts must have been the product of defendant's conscious objective, rather than the product of a mistake or accident, or mere negligence, or some other innocent reason.

Knowledge, of course, is a matter of inference from the proven facts, since you cannot read someone's mind. You have before you the evidence of acts alleged to have taken place by or with the defendant or in his presence. The government contends that these acts show beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the conspiracy.

The defendant denies that he was a member of a conspiracy. Specifically, the defendant denies that he committed the acts alleged by the prosecution to be sufficient to establish that he knowingly joined the charged conspiracy. It is for you to determine whether the prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed such knowledge and intent.

It is not necessary for the prosecution to show that the defendant was fully informed as to all the details of the conspiracy in order for you to infer knowledge on the part of the defendant. Similarly, it's not necessary for the defendant to have known every member of the conspiracy, nor is it necessary for the defendant to have received any monetary benefit from his participation in the conspiracy, or to have a financial stake in the outcome of the alleged joint venture. It's enough if the defendant participated in the conspiracy unlawfully and knowingly as I have defined those terms.

The duration and extent of the defendant's participation has no bearing on the issue of the defendant's guilt. If you find that the defendant joined the conspiracy at any time in its progress, then the defendant is held responsible for all that was done before he joined and all that was done during the conspiracy's existence while he was a member. Each member of a conspiracy may perform separate and distinct acts. Some conspirators play major roles, while others play minor roles in the scheme. An equal law is not what the law requires. In fact, even a single act may be sufficient to draw the defendant within the scope of the conspiracy.

However, a person's mere association with members of a conspiracy does not make that person a member of the conspiracy, even when that association is coupled with

knowledge that a conspiracy is taking place. Mere presence at the scene of the crime, even coupled with knowledge that a crime is taking place, is not sufficient to support a conviction. In other words, knowledge without agreement and participation is not sufficient. What is necessary is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant joined in the conspiracy with knowledge of its unlawful purpose and with an intent to aid the accomplishment of its unlawful objectives.

In sum, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, with an understanding of the unlawful character of the conspiracy, knowingly engaged advised, or assisted in the conspiracy for the purpose of committing a robbery. The defendant thereby became a knowing and willful participant in the unlawful agreement, that is to say, he became a conspirator. Once a conspiracy is formed, it is presumed to continue until either its objective is accomplished or there is no affirmative act of termination by its members. Once a person is found to be a member of a conspiracy, he is presumed to be a member of the conspiracy until te conspiracy is terminated, unless it's shown by some affirmative proof that the person withdrew and disassociated himself from it.

The indictment charges that the alleged conspiracy existed in or about March 2013. It's not essential that the prosecution prove that the conspiracy alleged started and ended on any specific dates. Indeed, it's sufficient if you find

that the conspiracy was formed and that it existed for some time within or around the dates set forth in the indictment, which is in or around March 2013. It does not matter if a specific event or transaction is alleged to have occurred on or about a certain date, and the evidence indicates that, in fact, it occurred on another date. The law only requires a substantial similarity between the dates alleged in the indictment and the dates established by the testimony and other evidence.

That is Count One.

I will now turn to Count Two of the indictment which alleges robbery.

The allegations contained in Count Two are brought not only under the law that prohibits robbery, but also under a provision of the federal criminal code that makes it a crime for anyone to aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, or procure the commission of another crime. I will provide instructions on these concepts in a few minutes.

To sustain its burden of proof on Count Two, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:

First, the government must prove that the defendant knowingly obtained or took the personal property of another or from the presence of another.

Second, the government must prove that the defendant

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took the property against the victim's will by actual or threatened force, violence or fear of injury, whether immediate or in the future.

Third, the government must prove that such actions actually or potentially in any way or degree obstructed, delayed, or affected interstate or foreign commerce.

(Continued on next page)

THE COURT: The first element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant knowingly obtained the personal property of another or from the presence of another. The term property includes tangible and intangible things of value. In this case, the government alleges that the object of the robbery charged in Count Two was narcotics proceeds or money from drugs.

The second element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant unlawfully took the personal property against the victim's will, by actual or threatened force, violence, or fear of injury, whether immediate or in the future.

It is not necessary that the government prove that force, violence and fear were all used or threatened. The government satisfies its burden if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that any of these methods were employed. However, there must be some nexus between the threat of use of force and the taking of property.

In considering whether the defendant used, or threatened to use, violence or fear, you should give those words their common, ordinary meaning, and understand them as you normally would. The violence does not have to be directed at the person whose property was taken. The use of a threat of force or violence might be aimed at a third person, or at causing financial rather than physical injury. A threat may be

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made verbally or by physical gesture. Whether a statement or physical gesture by the defendant actually was a threat depends upon the surrounding facts.

Fear exists if at least one victim experiences anxiety, concern, or worry over expected personal harm or business loss, or over financial or job security. existence of fear must be determined by the facts existing at the time of the defendant's actions.

Your decision whether the defendant used or threatened fear of injury involves a decision about the victim's state of mind at the time of the defendant's actions. You must determine, after careful consideration the circumstances and the evidence, whether fear would reasonably have been the victim's state of mind.

Looking at the situation and the actions of people involved may help you determine what their state of mind was. You can consider this kind of evidence, which is technically called circumstantial evidence, in deciding whether property was obtained by a defendant through the use of threat of fear.

You've also heard the testimony of some witnesses describing their state of mind - that is, how they felt - in giving up the property. This testimony was allowed to help you in deciding whether the property was obtained by fear. You should consider this testimony for that purpose only, and for no other purpose in that case. You are not bound by the

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statements of the witnesses in determining their states of mind, but you may consider all the facts and circumstances or lack of evidence in determining the state of mind of each witness at the time the alleged crimes occurred.

It is not necessary that the fear be a consequence of a direct threat; it is sufficient that the surrounding circumstances render the victim's fear reasonable. You must find beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable person would have been fearful under the circumstances.

If you decide that the defendant obtained another's property, against his will, by the use or threat of force, violence, or fear of injury, you must then decide whether this action would affect interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree. You must determine whether there is an actual or potential effect on commerce between any two or more states, or on commerce within one state that goes to another state or foreign country.

The requirement of showing an effect on commerce involves only a minimal burden of proving a connection to interstate or foreign commerce and is satisfied by conduct that affects commerce in any way or degree. The requirement may be satisfied by a showing of a very slight or potential effect on interstate or foreign commerce. For example, if a successful robbery of money would prevent the use of those funds to purchase articles which travel through interstate commerce,

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that would be a sufficient effect on interstate commerce.

If you decide that interstate or foreign commerce would potentially or probably be affected if the defendant had successfully and fully completed his actions, then the element of affecting interstate commerce is satisfied. You do not have to find that interstate or foreign commerce is actually affected.

The defendant need not have intended or anticipated an effect on interstate or foreign commerce. You may find that the effect is a natural consequence of his actions. If you find that the defendant intended to take certain actions - that is, he did the acts charged in the indictment in order to obtain property - and you find those actions have either caused, or would probably cause, an effect on interstate or foreign commerce, then you may find the requirements of this element have been satisfied.

Nor do you have to decide whether the effect on interstate or international commerce was or would have been harmful or beneficial to a particular business, or to commerce in general. The government satisfies its burden of proving an effect on commerce if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt any effect, whether harmful or not.

If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the target of the robbery purchased or sold items that flowed in interstate or foreign commerce, and that the money or items

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that the defendant conspired to take belonged to the target, then this element will have been met.

Moreover, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant believed that the target of the robbery purchased or sold items that flowed in interstate or foreign commerce, then this element will be satisfied, even if the defendant's belief ultimately proved incorrect. In other words, even if the target of the robbery was not in fact engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, this element will be satisfied if, at the time of the robbery, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to commit a robbery that would have, or potentially could have, affected interstate or foreign commerce.

When considering this element, it's important for you to know that commerce affected or potentially affected need not Activities affecting or potentially affecting unlawful interstate activity, such as drug dealing and trafficking, fall under the statute. Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended, for example, to rob drugs, and you find those drugs traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, this element has been satisfied.

The fourth element the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the robbery charge is that the defendant acted unlawfully and knowingly. I already

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explained these concepts to you, and you should follow my previous instructions on that point.

The defendant is also charged with aiding and abetting with respect to this charge; accordingly, it would be sufficient for this element if the defendant aided and abetted another person in the robbery charge.

Aiding and abetting liability is its own theory of criminal liability. In effect, it is a theory of liability that permits the defendant to be convicted of a specified crime, if the defendant, while not himself committing the crime, assisted another person or persons in committing the crime.

Under the federal aiding and abetting statute, whoever aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures the commission of an offense is punishable as a principal. In other words, it is not necessary for the government to show that the defendant physically committed a crime in order for you to find the defendant quilty. If you do not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant physically committed a crime, you may, under certain circumstances, still find him quilty of the crime as an aider or abettor.

A person who aids and abets another to commit an offense is just as quilty of that offense as if he personally had committed it. You may find the defendant quilty of the substantive crime, therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable

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doubt that the government has proven that another person actually committed the crime and that the defendant aided and abetted that person in the commission of the offense.

As you can see, the first requirement is that another person has committed the crime charged. Obviously, no one can be convicted of aiding and abetting the criminal acts of another if no crime is committed by the other person. But if you do find that a crime was committed, then you must consider whether the defendant aided or abetted the commission of the crime.

To aid and abet another to commit a crime, it is necessary that the defendant willfully and knowingly associate himself in some way with the crime, and that the defendant willfully and knowingly seek by some act to help make the crime succeed.

Participation in a crime is willful if action is taken voluntarily and intentionally, or in the case of a failure to act, with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done - that is to say, with a bad purpose either to disobey or ot disregard the law.

However, I must caution you that the mere presence of the defendant where a crime is being committed, even coupled with knowledge by the defendant that the crime was being committed, or the mere acquiescence by the defendant in the criminal conduct with others, even with guilty knowledge, is

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not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting. An aider and abettor must have some interest in the criminal act or acts.

To determine whether the defendant aided and abetted the commission of a crime, ask yourself these questions: the defendant participate in the crime charged as something he wished to bring about? Did the defendant associate himself with the criminal venture knowingly and willfully? Did the defendant seek by his actions to make the criminal venture succeed?

If the answer to all three is "yes" beyond a reasonable doubt, then the defendant is an aider and abettor and therefore quilty of the offense charged in Count Two.

If the answer to any of the three is "no," then the defendant is not an aider and abettor and is not quilty of that offense.

So now we turn to the third charge, which is kidnapping. Count Three charges the substantive crime of kidnapping. Specifically, Count Three charges the defendant with engaging in kidnapping on or about March 25, 2013. order to sustain its burden of proof with respect to the allegation of kidnapping charged in Count Three, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following four elements:

First, the government must prove that the defendant seized, or confined, or kidnapped, or abducted, or carried away

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an individual as described in Count Three;

Second, the government must prove that the defendant held the individual for ransom, reward, or for any other reason;

Third, the government must prove that the individual was transported in interstate or foreign commerce and that the defendant traveled in interstate or foreign commerce, or used any means, facility, instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing and in furtherance of the offense;

Fourth, the government must prove the defendant acted unlawfully, knowingly and willfully.

The defendant is also charged with aiding and abetting in the kidnapping; accordingly, it would be sufficient for this element if the defendant aid and abetted another person in the kidnapping.

I have already instructed about the law of aiding and abetting in detail and you should use those instructions here. Now, I will go through each of these elements in more detail.

The first element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant seized, confined, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away a victim.

Kidnap means take and carry away a person by force and against his or her will. Seize, confine, abduct or carry away all mean the physical and bodily taking and carrying away of a person, or the holding or restriction of someone by force or

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without that person's consent.

A second element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant took the individual for reward or financial gain. It is sufficient to satisfy this element if the government proves that at the time the defendant kidnapped the individual, he did so for some purpose. If you find the defendant did not hold an individual for the purpose of carrying out a robbery of narcotics proceeds, or if you have reasonable doubt as to this element, then it's your duty to acquit on this count.

The third element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that a victim of the kidnapping was transported in interstate commerce, or that the defendant traveled in interstate commerce or used the mail or any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate commerce in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense.

The government may satisfy this element by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used the United States mail or any means, facility or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the offense. The term "means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce" includes the use of a telephone in furtherance of committing the offense.

The final elements the government must prove beyond a

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reasonable doubt is that the defendant acted unlawfully and knowingly. I've already defined these terms. definitions apply with respect to Count Three.

In order to satisfy this element, the government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that a victim of the kidnapping was not with him voluntarily but, rather, was forced or made to go with him.

The defendant is also charged with aiding and abetting with respect to this charge; accordingly, it would be sufficient for this element if the defendant aided and abetted another person in the kidnapping. You should rely on the instructions I have given you about aiding and abetting liability.

Count Four is use of a firearm in connection with robbery and kidnapping. So, I have completed my instructions on Counts One, Two and Three. I'll instruct you now on the elements of Count Four.

Count Four alleges a violation of Section 924(c) of the Federal Criminal Code. That provision makes it is a crime for any person, "during and in relation to any crime of violence...for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States [to] use[] or carr[y] a firearm, " or, "in furtherance of any such crime, [to] possess[] a firearm."

Count Four is a firearms count connected to the robbery conspiracy charged in Count One and the kidnapping

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charged in Count Three. This means that you cannot consider Count Four unless you first determine that the defendant is quilty of either the robbery conspiracy charged in Count One or is quilty of the kidnapping charged in Count Three.

To sustain its burden of proof on Count Four, charging the defendant with possession of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, the prosecution must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that on or about the dates alleged in Count Four of the indictment, the defendant used or carried or possessed a firearm, or any combination of those acts, or aided and abetted the use, carrying or possession of a firearm by another; and

Second, that the defendant used or carried the firearm, or aided and abetted the use and carrying of the firearm, during and in relation to the specified crime of violence, or that the defendant possessed a firearm, or aided and abetted the possession of a firearm, in furtherance of that same crime; and

Third, that the defendant acted knowingly.

I'll now discuss each element in further detail.

The first element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in Count Four is that on or about March 25, 2013, the date in the indictment, the defendant used, carried, or possessed a firearm.

As used in the statute, the term "firearm" means "any weapon...which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive."

I instruct you that a gun is a firearm.

In considering the specific element of whether the defendant used, carried, or possessed a firearm, it does not matter whether the weapon was loaded or operable - meaning useable at the time of the crime. Operability is not relevant to your determination of whether a weapon is a firearm.

In order to prove that the defendant "used" the firearm, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was "an active employment" of the firearm by the defendant during and in relation to the commission of the crime of violence. This does not mean that the defendant must have actually fired or tried to fire the weapon, although each of these actions will obviously be considered a use of the weapon.

Brandishing or even referring to the weapon so that others present knew that the defendant has the firearm available, if needed, all constitute uses of a firearm.

"Brandishing" means displaying all or part of the firearm, or otherwise making the presence of the firearm known to another person in order to intimidate that person. The mere possession of a firearm at or near the site of the crime without active employment is not enough to count as use of a firearm.

In order to prove that the defendant "carried" a firearm, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a weapon within his control so that it was available in such a way that it furthered the commission of the crime. The defendant need not have held the firearm

physically or have had actual possession of it on his person.

If you find that the defendant had control over the place where the firearm was located, and had the power and intention to exercise control over the firearm, and that the firearm was immediately available to him in such a way that it furthered the commission of a crime of violence, you may find that the prosecution has proven that the defendant carried a firearm.

The legal concept of possession may differ from the everyday usage of the term, so let me explain it. Most of us think of possession as having physical custody or control of an object. However, a person does not need to have actual, physical possession, that is, physical custody of an object, in order to be in legal possession of it. If an individual has the ability to exercise substantial control over an object that he does not have in his physical custody, and the intent to exercise such control, then he is in possession of that article. This is called constructive possession.

Control over an object may be demonstrated by the existence of a working relationship between the person having

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such control and the person with actual physical custody. person having control possesses an object because he has an effective working relationship with the people who have actual physical custody of the object, and because he can direct the movement or transfer of that object.

As an example, I possess law books in my chambers, even though I'm here in my courtroom, which is on a different I have control of those books.

More than one person can have control over the same firearm. The law recognizes that possession may be sole or If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If more than one person has possession of it, as I have defined possession for you, then possession is joint. That is what is meant by "possession."

Possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence requires that the defendant possess a firearm and that the possession move the crime forward. The mere presence of a firearm is not enough. Possession in furtherance requires that the possession is in relation to and an essential part of the The firearm must have played some part in furthering the crime in order for this element to be satisfied.

The defendant is also charged with aiding and abetting with respect to this charge; accordingly, it would be sufficient for this element if the defendant aided and abetted

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another person in the use, carrying, or possession of a firearm. You should rely on the instructions I have given you about aiding and abetting liability. However, some additional instructions apply to this charge.

In order to convict the defendant of aiding and abetting another's use or carrying of a firearm, or possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, the government must establish (1) that the defendant actively participated in the underlying crime of violence, here, (a) the robbery conspiracy charged in Count One of the indictment (b) the kidnapping charged in Count Three; and (2) that the defendant did so with advance knowledge that another participant in the robbery conspiracy charged in Count One or the kidnapping charged in Count Three would use or carry a firearm, or possess a firearm in furtherance of the charged crimes of violence.

As to the first part, "active participation" does not require that the defendant participated in each and every element of the underlying crime of violence. Instead, the defendant's participation may be limited to only one or some of the elements of the underlying crimes of violence.

As to the second part, in order for a defendant to have had "advanced knowledge" of another participant's use or carrying of a firearm, or possession of a firearm in furtherance of the crime of violence, the defendant needs to

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have had that knowledge at a point before or even during the commission of the crime when the defendant still had the opportunity to walk away from participating in the offense if he chose to do so.

If a defendant who has the opportunity to walk away from participating in an offense chooses to continue to participate in the offense after learning that another participant will use or carry a firearm, or possess a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, or is currently using or carrying a firearm, or possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, that defendant has the requisite advance knowledge to make him an aider or abettor of the other participant's use or carrying of a firearm, or possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. government has not proved the requisite advanced knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt, you must acquit the defendant of that charge.

The second element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant used or carried a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, or possessed a firearm in furtherance of such a crime. Possession in furtherance, as I indicated, requires that the possession be incident to and an essential part of the crime. The firearm must have played some part in furthering the crime in order for this element to be satisfied.

This means that, for example, unless you find that the defendant participated in the crime of violence charged in Count One or Count Three described in the indictment, you must find him not guilty of Count Four.

You are instructed that kidnapping and robbery each qualify as crimes of violence. I've already instructed you on the law relevant to those crimes, and you should follow those instructions here.

The third element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant knew that he was using, carrying, or possessing a firearm, or aiding and abetting the use, carry, or possession of a firearm, and that he was acting knowingly in doing so. I have already instructed you on what "knowingly" means in this context.

If, and only if, you find the defendant guilty on Count Four, you will have to answer an additional question: whether one or more firearms were brandished in the course of the commission of the crime, whether by the defendant or another.

Please note that whether the defendant or another brandished a firearm in the course of the commission of the crime does not affect your determination of whether the government has met its burden of proof regarding the underlying crime; instead, it is an additional question you must answer only if you have already found that the government has proved

the defendant guilty of the underlying crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

In order to prove that the defendant or another "brandished" the firearm, the government must prove that the defendant or another displayed all or part of the firearm, or otherwise made the presence of the firearm known to another person, in order to intimidate that person. This does not mean that the defendant or another must have actually fired or attempted to fire the weapon, although each of those actions would obviously involve brandishing the weapon.

In addition to the elements of each of the charges that I have already described, for each crime charged in the indictment, you must also consider whether any act in further of the unlawful activity occurred within the Southern District of New York. The place where such acts took place is called venue.

The Southern District of New York includes all of Manhattan, the Bronx and Westchester. It also includes all of the waters surrounding Manhattan, Brooklyn, Staten Island, and Long Island, and the air and bridges over those waters.

I should note that on this issue — and this issue alone — the government need not prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt, but only by a preponderance of the evidence. A "preponderance" means that the evidence shows it is more likely than not that something occurred. The government has satisfied

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its burden under the venue element if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the crime charged or any act in furtherance of the crime occurred in the Southern District of New York.

If, on the other hand, you find that the government has failed to prove the venue requirement by a preponderance of the evidence for a particular count, then you must acquit the defendant on that count.

Those are the substantive charges. I have a few final general instructions that I'll give you at this point.

The indictment in this case refers to various dates. The evidence might have established different dates. only requires a substantial similarity between the dates alleged and the dates established by the evidence.

Stipulations: In this case, you've heard evidence in the form of stipulations. A stipulation is an agreement between the parties. Some of the stipulations that you heard contained facts that were agreed to be true, and others describe testimony that a witness, if called, would have given. You must accept as true the facts contained in these stipulations, including that a witness would have given certain testimony. However, it is for you to determine the weight, if any, to be given that testimony or fact.

You have heard references to certain investigative techniques that were used or not used by law enforcement

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authorities in the case. There is no legal requirement that the government prove its case through any particular means.

Your concern is to determine whether or not, based on the evidence or lack of evidence, the quilt of the defendant has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consciousness of quilt: You have heard testimony that the defendant fled after he believed that he was about to be charged with committing the crime for which he is now on trial, and he was stopped in New Jersey.

If you find that the defendant attempted to evade arrest by fleeing, you may, but are not required to, infer that the defendant believed that he was quilty of the crimes for which he is here today.

Evidence of flight may not be used by you as a substitute for proof of guilt. Flight does not create a presumption of quilt. Flight alone, or consciousness of quilt alone, are not sufficient to convict, and do not constitute evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether or not evidence of flight shows that the defendant believed that he was guilty of the crime for which he is now charged and the significance, if any, to be given to such evidence, is for you, the jury, to decide.

Persons not on trial: Some of the people who may have been involved in the events leading to this trial are not on This does not matter. There is no requirement that all trial.

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members of a conspiracy be charged and prosecuted, or tried together, in the same proceeding. You may not draw any inference, favorable or unfavorable, towards the government or the defendant from the fact that certain people other than the defendant are not named in the indictment. You may not consider the absence of other people at trial in any way in reaching your verdict.

Preparation of witnesses: You have heard that witnesses have discussed the facts of the case and their testimony with the lawyers before the witnesses appeared in Court.

Although you may consider that fact when you are evaluating a witness' credibility, there is nothing unusual or improper about a witness meeting with lawyers before testifying so the witness can be aware of the subjects he or she will be questioned about.

Uncalled witnesses: There are persons whose names you heard during the course of the trial, but did not appear to testify. I instruct you that each party had an equal opportunity or lack of opportunity to call any of these witnesses. Therefore, you should not draw any inference or reach any conclusions as to what they would have testified to had they been called. Their absence should not affect your judgment in any way. You should remember my instruction, however, that the law does not impose on any defendant in a

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criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence, and that it is the government's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each count in the indictment as to the defendant.

The defendant's right not to testify: The defendant did not testify in this case. Under our Constitution, a defendant has no obligation to testify or to present any evidence, because it is the government's burden to prove the defendant's quilt beyond a reasonable doubt. That burden remains with the government throughout the entire trial and never shifts to the defendant. A defendant is never required to prove that he is innocent.

You may not attach any significance to the fact that the defendant did not testify. No adverse inference against the defendant may be drawn by you because he did not take the witness stand and you may not consider the fact that the defendant did not take the stand at all in your deliberations in the jury room.

Law enforcement witnesses: You have heard the testimony of law enforcement witnesses. The fact that a witness may be employed as a law enforcement official or employee does not mean that his or her testimony is deserving of more or less consideration, or greater or lesser weight, than that of an ordinary witness.

In this context, defense counsel are allowed to try to

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attack the credibility of such a witness on the ground that his or her testimony may be colored by a personal or professional interest in the outcome of the case.

It's for you to decide, after reviewing all of the evidence or lack of evidence, whether to accept the testimony of law enforcement witnesses, as it is with every other type of witnesses, and to give that testimony the weight you find it deserves.

Expert witnesses: You've heard testimony from what we call expert witnesses. Expert witnesses are witnesses who, by education or experience, have acquired learning in a science or a specialized area of knowledge. Such witnesses are permitted to give their opinions as to relevant matters in which they profess to be experts and give their reasons for their opinions. Expert testimony is presented to you on the theory that someone who is experienced in the field can assist you in understanding the evidence or in reaching an independent decision on the facts.

Your role in judging credibility applies to experts as well as other witnesses. You should consider the expert opinions that were received in evidence in the case and give them as much or as little weight as you think they deserve. you should decide that the opinion of an expert was not based on sufficient education, experience, or data, or if you should conclude that the trustworthiness or credibility of an expert

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is questionable for any reason, or if the opinion of the expert was outweighed, in your judgment, by other evidence in the case, then you might disregard the opinion of the expert entirely or in part.

On the other hand, if you find the opinion of an expert is based on sufficient data, education, and experience, and the other evidence does not give you reason to doubt his or her conclusions, you would be justified in placing reliance on the expert's testimony, but the extent of such reliance is your choice.

You have heard the testimony of a witness who has testified under a grant of immunity from this court. What that means is that the testimony of the witness may not be used against him in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with an immunity order of this court.

You are instructed that the government is entitled to call, as a witness, a person who has been granted immunity and that you may convict a defendant on the basis of such a witness' testimony alone, if you find the testimony proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the testimony of a witness who has been granted immunity should be examined by you with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. You should scrutinize it closely to determine whether or not it is colored

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in such a way as to place quilt upon the defendant in order to further the witness' own interests; for, such a witness, confronted with the realization that he can win his own freedom by helping to convict another, has a motive to falsify his testimony.

Such testimony should be scrutinized by you with great care and you should act upon it with caution. If you believe it to be true, and determine to accept the testimony, you may give it such weight, if any, as you believe it deserves.

Use of evidence obtained pursuant to search: You have heard testimony about evidence seized during searches. Evidence obtained from the searches was properly admitted in this case and may be properly considered by you.

Whether you approve or disapprove of how it was obtained should not enter into your deliberations because I now instruct you that the government's use of this evidence is lawful.

Charts and tables: Some of the exhibits admitted into evidence were charts. These charts were introduced basically They are summaries of the evidence and are not as summaries. direct evidence of proof. They are a visual representation of information or data that is in evidence. They are intended to be of assistance to you in your deliberations.

In presenting the evidence which you have heard, it can be easier to use summary charts than to place all of the

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relevant documents in front of you. It is up to you to decide whether those charts fairly and correctly present the information in the testimony and the documents.

To the extent that the charts conform with what you determine the underlying evidence to be, you may accept them. But one way or the other, realize that the charts are not in and of themselves direct evidence, and the weight you give them, if any, is your choice.

There may be some documents or audio recordings in evidence that are redacted. "Redacted" means that part of the document or audio recording was taken out. You are to concern yourself only with the part of the item that has been admitted into evidence. You should not consider any possible reason why other parts of it have been deleted.

Certain recordings have been admitted into evidence. Whether you approve or disapprove of the recordings of these conversations may not enter your deliberations. recordings were made in a lawful manner and the government's use of this evidence is lawful.

You must, therefore, regardless of any personal opinions, give this evidence full consideration along with all the other evidence in the case in determining whether the government has proved the defendant's quilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The transcripts of the recordings were provided to you

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to assist you in listening to the recordings. However, it is the tape recorded conversations, not the transcripts, that are the evidence in this case.

One of the most important issues in this case is the identification of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes. The government has the burden of proof of proving identity, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not essential that a witness be free from doubt as to the correctness of his or her identification of the defendant. However, you, the jury, must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the accuracy of the identification of the defendant before you may convict him. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who committed a particular crime, you must find the defendant not guilty of that crime.

Identification testimony is an expression of belief on the part of the witness. Its value depends on the opportunity the witness had to observe the offender at the time of the offense and later to make a reliable identification of the offender.

You will hear arguments of counsel on the subject. will only suggest to you that you should consider the following matters: Did a witness have the ability and adequate opportunity to see the offender at the time of the offense? Has a witness' identification of the defendant as the offender been influenced in any way? Has his or her identification been

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unfairly suggested by events that occurred since the time of the offense or by the circumstances under which the identification was made? Is his or her recollection accurate?

In addition, you should consider the credibility of an identification witness just as you would any other witness. Let me repeat, the burden is on the prosecution to prove every element of each crime charged, including the identity of the defendant as the offender. Therefore, if, after examining all of the evidence, you find that a crime was committed, but you have reasonable doubt about whether it was the defendant who committed the crime, you must find him not guilty of that crime.

Alternate jurors: There are two alternate jurors. The alternate jurors will not join in deliberations unless a member of the jury is discharged. The alternate jurors will be taken to a separate room by Mr. Street where they'll remain until a verdict is reached, unless called to replace a juror. The alternate jurors are not to discuss the case with each other or anyone else until and unless they're asked to replace a juror who is discharged. If an alternate juror replaces a member of the jury, I'll instruct the jury to begin its deliberations over.

With these instructions in mind, it says you will now here from the lawyers, actually, we will now take a lunch But after the lunch break, you'll hear from the lawyers

who will give their closing arguments.

I remind you that arguments by lawyers are not evidence because the lawyers are not witnesses. However, what they say to you in their closing arguments is intended to help you understand the evidence and reach your verdict. So please pay careful attention to the arguments.

We'll have our lunch break, we'll come back, we'll hear the closing arguments. Then I'll give you the final instructions, and then you'll retire to deliberate. Enjoy your lunch. Let's see what time it is. It's 11:40. Let's come back at 1:00 and we will begin the closing arguments then.

Please don't talk about the case. Please leave the charge here in the courtroom on your chair. We'll see you at 1:00. Thank you.

(Jury excused)

(In open court; jury not present)

THE COURT: You may be seated.

I received from you all a long time ago a verdict sheet, which was a joint verdict sheet. I plan to use that and hand it to all members of the jury. We're adjourned.

MR. DRATEL: I reassert my objection. After the charge, I have to reassert what we had gone through in the redline and then this morning.

THE COURT: Thank you. The motion is denied.

Thank you. We'll break for lunch.

takes.

1 MR. ARAVIND: Thank you. 2 (Pause) 3 THE COURT: I wanted to ask about length of summations 4 before our break so we all understand what the plan is when we come back. Let me ask Mr. Dratel. How long are you planning 5 6 to sum up? 7 MR. DRATEL: I would like to keep it at 35 minutes. THE COURT: Thirty-five? 8 9 MR. DRATEL: Yes. I think certainly less than 45. Ιt 10 depends on what the government does. 11 THE COURT: Thirty-five to 45. Assuming if you had 12 the same amount of time as 45 minutes, is that sufficient? 13 MR. ARAVIND: I think I was timing it so far to be 45 14 to an hour, so I think about an hour is probably more. 15 THE COURT: Total time? MR. ARAVIND: For the opening summation and then 16 Ms. Tekeei will do rebuttal, which will be shorter. 17 18 THE COURT: It sounds like we're talking about over an 19 hour. 20 MR. ARAVIND: I think the opening summation is looking 21 like about an hour. I think the rebuttal will probably be 20 22 minutes. 23 MS. TEKEEI: Yes. 24 MR. ARAVIND: Again, depending on how long Mr. Dratel 25

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1 THE COURT: Mr. Dratel. MR. DRATEL: You know, it all depends on what --2

THE COURT: On how long they speak.

MR. DRATEL: Right, but also just in terms of rebuttal as a genuine rebuttal and not just a second summation --

THE COURT: Right. I think we should agree on a time and that you should reserve some time for rebuttal; that way, Mr. Dratel has the opportunity to use an equal amount of time if he wants to. Can you?

MR. ARAVIND: Your Honor, we have been preparing this summation for the last few days.

THE COURT: I understand, so you think it's an hour.

MR. ARAVIND: I think the opening summation is an hour. We have to marshal a lot of evidence.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. ARAVIND: Now given the Court's ruling today, I have to pay particular attention to some of the circumstantial evidence and the phone records that are in evidence, which take a little bit more time to explain.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ARAVIND: That was my estimate when I did this at 3:00 o'clock in the morning last night. I'm not sure how that would be now.

THE COURT: How it plays out. Okay. At least we have We think it's an hour. You think it's 20 minutes. a preview.

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And the defense can sum up for an equal amount of time if you want but at some point, it's not advocacy anymore. At some point, you put your jurors to sleep and the jury is not well served and your case is not well served, but I leave the strategic decisions to all of you.

MR. DRATEL: I'm not intending just to fill up the time because they used up more time. Obviously, what the government does in its opening summation may affect whether it's 35 or 40 or 45 minutes.

THE COURT: Sure. I won't ring a bell. I won't hold up any signs. I'll let you proceed.

MR. ARAVIND: Thank you.

(Luncheon recess)

(Continued on next page)

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## AFTERNOON SESSION

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1:05 p.m.

THE COURT: Welcome back, ladies and gentlemen. gave you the instructions about closing statements before our lunch break, so I won't repeat that. We can start now, if you are ready, Mr. Aravind.

MR. ARAVIND: Thank you, your Honor.

Good afternoon. Get on the top of the bed. Look forward. Don't look back.

That's what that man shouted at Emma Torruella when he forced her onto the bed in her bedroom, her hands bound tightly with a scarf. That's what this man said when he kidnapped Ms. Torruella, grabbed her neck and forced her into a car to go pick up a bag full of money. That's what this man said during the course of kidnapping and robbing Ms. Torruella and David That's what this man said and did to make Ms. Torruella believe that she was going to die.

What Antione Chambers didn't count on when he ran out of 1403 Overing Street the morning of March 25, 2013 with \$20,000 was that he would end up here.

He didn't count on the fact that David Barea and Emma Torruella would come here and testify and tell you exactly about their nightmare that they experienced that night or that Ms. Torruella would remember part of the license plate of Chambers' girlfriend's car that they used to abduct her during

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the robbery.

He didn't count on the fact that a friend from his neighborhood would show an agent a cracked cell phone screen with Twizzie's name and contact information.

He didn't count on the fact that eventually the FBI would get involved in this case and identify him as the user of his phone or that an FBI agent would track his phone, showing him going from the apartment that he shared with Zaporia Dunbar directly to Tyrone Brown's apartment after Brown called him to tip him off about a robbery at the exact time of the robbery.

It's simple. This defendant didn't count on getting caught redhanded that day. But when the defendant eventually realized that the NYPD and the FBI were looking for him, he fled. And when he was caught, finally, the defendant was caught in a rental car that wasn't in his own name with a whole new identity.

Earlier this week we told you that we would prove to you that Antione Chambers committed a brutal armed robbery and kidnapping of David Barea and Emma Torruella last March and that is exactly what the evidence has shown.

In this trial you heard testimony from 11 witnesses.

You heard from Ms. Torruella, who told you that she was robbed by a man who grabbed her neck and forced her into a car and pushed her on the floor just as she thought she was going to die.

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You heard from David Barea, who told you in clear detail about what happened to him at Tyrone Brown's apartment at 1338 Croes Avenue and then at Emma Torruella's apartment at 1403 Overing.

You heard from Demi Torres about what she unmistakably saw that night, her mother in distress. You saw phone record evidence showing that the defendant was in contact with Tyrone Brown, another drug dealer who had purchased crack from Barea and who set up the robbery just before the robbery happened.

You saw the video of Barea being attacked and robbed by two men. You also saw the cell site location evidence which showed you that the defendant traveled from his apartment in the north Bronx to the robbery scene right before the robbery and then traveled back to his apartment right after the robbery and then went to Pennsylvania the next day.

And you saw that fake ID that the defendant was found with when he was arrested in New Jersey.

This afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, I am going to go through the evidence that you have heard and seen and that establishes how the evidence proves that the defendant is guilty.

While I go through the evidence I'm also going to address some of the arguments that I expect the defense attorney will make in his summation.

I want to be clear. The defendant has absolutely no

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burden. It is the government's burden to prove the defendant's It is a burden we embrace and which we have met here. auilt. But when a defendant chooses to cross-examine witnesses and make arguments, we can address those arguments in summation, and I'll be doing that today.

I'm also going to talk very, very briefly about some of the charges, but I am not going to spend much time on that because you just heard the charge from Judge Schofield.

First, I want to talk about what's not in dispute. There is no serious dispute that David Barea and Emma Torruella were robbed and kidnapped at gunpoint on March 25 of last year. Even in his opening, defense counsel conceded that there is no dispute that there was a robbery and Emma Torruella and David Barea were taken against their will to get money.

There is also no dispute that David Barea was a serious drug dealer and one of his customers was Tyrone Brown, another drug dealer. You heard the wiretap calls. There is no dispute about that, ladies and gentlemen.

There is also no dispute that the defendant was in a relationship with Zaporia Dunbar, that they had a child together, and they previously lived at 4782 Barnes Avenue, before they both left town suddenly once the FBI came knocking on their door.

So what is in serious dispute? It's simple. thing the defense has to dispute, the one thing that they

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cannot admit, in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, is They have to dispute that the defendant was one of obvious. the robbers, the identity of the tall quy. But you know that he was one of the robbers because of all of the evidence you heard and saw in this case.

So what evidence am I talking about? During the course of the summation I am going to focus on eight main forms and types of evidence.

First, you heard the testimony of Ms. Torruella, the woman who woke up to find the defendant at her doorstep in the middle of a robbery and a kidnapping. Now, she made a prior identification that it was the defendant who grabbed her neck and took her to her mother's apartment so that she could get that bag of cash under her mom's bed. I am going to spend some time talking about Ms. Torruella's testimony.

And what happens when they go to Emma's mother's house? You next had the testimony of Demi Torres.

Third, you have the testimony of David Barea. Barea is a drug dealer, pure and simple. But he did not deserve to be robbed and kidnapped at quapoint, and his testimony of that evening was devastating and detailed, and it is completely corroborated by the other evidence in this case.

Fourth, you have that surveillance video at Croes Avenue which corroborates what David Barea told you.

Fifth, you have the testimony of law enforcement

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officers. You heard from Detective Deloren, who responded to the robbery. He found Barea with bruises. You also heard that he found a hammer in Chambers' girlfriend's Honda Accord that was used during the robbery. You heard from Special Agent John Reynolds, who analyzed the cell phone evidence and was able to determine who Antione Chambers was. The testimony of these law enforcement agents corroborates what the victims told you.

Sixth, you had the unmistakable evidence from numerous sources, the prison guard, the screen shot from Kentrell Ferguson's phone, Tyrone Brown's phones, and the toll records that the defendant Antione Chambers' nickname was Twizzie and that the defendant used a phone to communicate with Brown before and right after the robbery.

Seventh, you have the cell site location evidence that shows where that phone associated with Twizzie was that morning. You know, ladies and gentlemen, that that is the defendant. The evidence showed you that right before the robbery the defendant traveled from Barnes Avenue to Croes Avenue, and then right after the robbery he traveled back to his place on Barnes Avenue.

Eighth, you have the testimony of Officer DeRosa, who stopped and eventually arrested the defendant. That testimony shows that after he knew the FBI and the NYPD were out looking for him, the defendant and his girlfriend left down. They were eventually found in New Jersey with the defendant with a fake

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driver's license in a rental car he didn't even rent.

Let's talk about the evidence. And this case starts with David Barea. David Barea sold drugs, then he became a confidential informant, and then he sold drugs again when he wasn't supposed to. One of David Barea's customers was Tyrone And Brown used to buy cocaine and crack cocaine from Brown. Barea. Brown was also a drug dealer. In fact, he was caught with this package of drugs when he was arrested as part of this This is Government Exhibit 600.

And you know, on March 25, 2013, Barea went to Tyrone Brown's apartment. Brown had purchased crack cocaine from Barea a little while earlier. And as part of their usual arrangement, Barea was coming over to pick up the money.

There is David Barea. And before David Barea met up with Tyrone Brown, he contacted him, as he usually did. What did Barea tell you?

- Did you tell him you were going there?
- "A. Yeah. I had spoken to him during the day.
- "Q. How did you communicate with him?
- "A. By phone or text."

What do the phone records show? Exactly that. is the call. We talked about it. At 12:56, Barea sends a text message to Tyrone Brown. Remember, it looks like 11:56. You heard testimony from Special Agent Reynolds that that is a text message. And the text message is kept in central time.

Summation - Mr. Aravind

call actually takes place at 12:56, after midnight, just minutes before the robbery. We don't know the content of that message, but you know from your common sense what it said. I'm coming over.

What does Tyrone Brown do? One minute later, at 12:57, he calls that 6130 phone number. Who is that? That's the defendant, Antione Chambers. And they have a 33-second call. What does your common sense tell you happened during that call? It's time. He is coming over. You and Dee should come over and do this. This is the setup call, ladies and gentlemen. This sets up the robbery. Brown is calling his coconspirator, Antione Chambers, and tipping him off that David Barea is about to show up.

What happens next? 1:02, five minutes later, Brown gets a call, again, now from Chambers, and, again, you can use your common sense to infer what this call is about. Is he here yet? Three minutes later. Brown calls back. He's on his way. He's almost here. And then David Barea shows up outside of 1338 Croes Avenue. Again, there is that screen shot. Brown let's Barea enter the apartment to finish their drug business. And shortly afterward Steven Glisson and Antione Chambers show up just like clock work. There they are.

As Barea leaves the apartment, Chambers and Glisson push through the door with guns. The defendant and Glisson immediately began shouting at Barea demanding where the money

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Summation - Mr. Aravind

was. That's the video. Chambers is the first man. Dee, Steven Glisson, is the second. How do you know that that's Antione Chambers assaulting the victim? Because of all of the other evidence in this case.

The rest of the story is taken over by David Barea. Chambers hits Barea, you have seen it in the video, and Barea fights back. Two things happened that are very significant. The first is Barea's words. We were tussling for a couple of seconds. We were fighting. I was slamming him on the wall. He slammed me. And as we were still struggling, Dee came in right after him and put the gun to my head and was like, stay the fuck still, stay the fuck still. Glisson brandishes a gun and points it to the defendant's head.

And what does the defendant say? Again, David Barea: The tall guy kept beating me. He put my face to the wall and told me not to look at him. He was just beating on me. He had a hammer in his hand hitting me on my back, my shoulder blade, my legs.

- What, if anything, did he say to you?
- That not to look at him, don't look at my fucking face, don't look at me, don't look at me."
  - You know, ladies and gentlemen, that this is the hammer.

Now, that's what the defendant told David Barea, not to look at him, because that was the most important thing that

concerned the defendant, not to be seen, not to be detected, not to be identified.

And you heard that the robbers were very careful that evening. They wore gloves, masks. They had part of their faces covered. They used a gun with a potato on it so it would muffle the sound in case there was violence, a homemade silencer. They were cautious and they didn't take chances.

Remember this video? This is Steven Glisson and Antione Chambers approaching David Barea's apartment. What happens? The light goes on and look at their reaction. They were afraid of being seen. They are afraid of the light. And then they finally recover and they get ready to do the robbery.

These guys were professionals. They didn't leave a trace in that apartment. You heard that the DNA on the duct tape turned out to exclude Chambers, and there was enough DNA on that hammer.

What happens next? With a gun pointed to his head,
Barea made a quick decision. He wanted to stall for time, so
he told Chambers and Glisson that there was money at the
apartment he shared with Emma Torruella. And so what did they
do? They took him that way. And then you see Tyrone Brown.
This is them leaving the apartment and there is David Barea
with his hands behind his back and the defendant. Chambers and
Glisson grab Barea. They bind his hands with duct tape. They
take him to Torruella's house so they can get the money that

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they wanted. You heard they hit Barea with a hammer. They pointed a gun at him. Meanwhile, Tyrone Brown, the setup man, walked calmly to the door, locked it, and then walks out a few minutes later. Do you remember that part of the video. Brown is cool as a cucumber.

Before we continue to talk about that night, we need to take a minute to talk about the relationship between Antione Chambers and Tyrone Brown. They are friends. They are also partners in crime. You can see that from the phone evidence that is admitted as part of this case. Remember, this is the chart that Special Agent Reynolds prepared. It shows all the phone contact between Tyrone Brown and Twizzie, who you know is Antione Chambers, calls on March 17, March 18, over and over and over again, a week before the robbery. They talked to each other all the time. And guess what? They talked to each other on the phone, especially when David Barea is around. have the phones, the calls between Brown and Twizzie before the robbery on the 17th and the 18th. What did David Barea tell you about that? Barea said that about a week before the robbery he sees Tyrone Brown in the area around his apartment.

Just like on the day of the robbery, a week before the robbery takes place, Chambers is home on Barnes Avenue. starts talking to Brown, who has been in contact with Barea. And Chambers heads down to Brown's apartment. reflected in the cell site map that Special Agent Perry

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prepared. Remember what Barea told you. He said that he and Tyrone Brown called, exchanged calls the week before the robbery, and they met up. And you saw the cell sites. The defendant, Antione Chambers, also went to the vicinity of Brown's apartment that day, the exact same thing he does a week later, the day of the robbery, when David Barea calls Brown and meets up with Brown.

You can infer what's happening here, ladies and The defendant is casing out his target. He was a professional. He wanted to make sure that it went off without a hitch. And he enlisted Tyrone Brown to help him.

You heard during the jury charge the members of a conspiracy don't sit around a table planning crimes. Often we have to use circumstantial evidence to figure out what criminals are doing. And the pattern of calls between Tyrone Brown and Antione Chambers on March 17 and 18 and then the calls right before the robbery show that conspiracy forming, and eventually Tyrone Brown tips off his friend, the defendant, about the robbery.

Let's go back now to the day of the robbery and let's fast forward until we get to 1403 Overing. Once the defendant and Glisson and the light-skinned or light-eyed robber, as Emma Torruella called him, kidnapped Barea, they take him to Emma Torruella's apartment and Barea and Torruella told you what happened next. They told you what happened inside their own

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apartment, their home, two strange men wearing masks, gloves, going through their things and demanding money.

Torruella told you that they then went to a third apartment, her mom's apartment, where she took out a bag that she stashed there, a bag containing \$20,000 which contained her boyfriend or her common law husband's dirty drug money. The other witness who told you about that was Demi Torres, who was present when the defendant came to her door to pick up that bag of money.

Now you know what happens next. The testimony of Barea, Torruella, and Torres is not disputed when it comes to the brutality and the violence that the robbers committed. What is disputed is the identity of the tall guy. We know the identity of the tall guy from all of the objective evidence in this case and what the witnesses told you that led law enforcement to find and apprehend the defendant.

Let's start with Emma Torruella. You heard that Emma Torruella got a good look at the defendant when he took off his mask when he was in the Honda Accord. Let's talk for a second about Emma Torruella. Let's talk about what happened during her testimony.

What I submit happened to you and what you witnessed was a witness who came into this courtroom that day ready to confront the man who had grabbed her neck and kidnapped her. She told you in detail what happened to her. She told you that

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Summation - Mr. Aravind

she thought she was going to die. And she was strong. identified the defendant in court and told her account of what happened. But then you saw what happened to her.

Ladies and gentlemen, what you saw, I submit, was a witness who had a breakdown before your very eyes. You saw a woman who was confronted repeatedly with the face of her attacker.

MR. DRATEL: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. ARAVIND: Staring up at her from the exhibits and his face staring at her from the courtroom, and she fell apart. She was asked to identify the defendant and then she just couldn't do it anymore. That happened, ladies and gentlemen. This is real life. And what happened to Emma Torruella was real.

But this trial didn't end when Emma Torruella got off the witness stand. Instead, you heard all of the evidence that shows that Antione Chambers is quilty of the charges in this case. Let's talk about that evidence right now. And let's look at the phone calls during the robbery. You heard from David Barea that the two robbers took his phone and used it. Here is the testimony:

I asked him, you know, if he could please call the tall guy because they were taking too long.

Yes.

And how did he do that? He used a phone that was on top of the table. There was a table by the kitchen in the hallway, my phone. That's David Barea's testimony.

What did Emma Torruella say? The exact same thing?

Let's look at the phone evidence first and then we will look at

Ms. Torruella's testimony.

This is the reports for one of David Barea's phones. And what does it show you? Special Agent Reynolds told you exactly what it did. That's that 8485 number which we know is one of Groovy, David Barea's number, calling that 9462 number, which you remember is the John 129 cell phone. It's one call from one Barea number to another Barea number, exactly like David Barea told you.

What is also the significance of that? It means that the robbers are using Barea's cell phones that he took with him to communicate with each other. And it's precisely why you don't see any phone contact on Antione Chambers' Twizzie phone. That's the 6130 phone that we looked so much at.

Remember that gap that Special Agent Reynolds told you about? That's what that was. These guys were professionals. They wanted to use their victim's phones to contact each other because they didn't want to leave a trace. They didn't want to have anything to link them to the scene of the crime. That's why we don't have cell sites for the Twizzie phone at Overing or Bruckner, because the defendant didn't use his cell phone

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then. He was using Barea's phone.

And what happened when Emma and the defendant left to go to Emma's mother's apartment on Bruckner? Emma Torruella got a good look at that car, that Honda Accord, that same car that was sitting outside of Zaporia Dunbar's apartment after the robbery. That's the car.

This is a very important moment, ladies and gentlemen. Emma Torruella told you on the witness stand that she remembered the numbers 7788, and I bet it's four numbers that she will never ever forget. At the time of the robbery she remembered two letters, two. Who testified to that? Special Agent Reynolds and Detective Deloren.

Think about that for a minute, ladies and gentlemen. Emma Torruella is in the middle of her nightmare and she remembers six out of the seven digits or numbers on the license She wants to remember because she doesn't want to forget. She wants to know who did this to her. And she tells the agents that and that's exactly what they do during the investigation. They find the car that was used during the robbery right outside the defendant's front door on Barnes Avenue.

Now, I expect Mr. Dratel to argue that you should discount Ms. Torruella's identification of that car. She said Acura, not Honda. And when the agents found that Honda Accord, and not that Acura, it must mean that the agents have the wrong

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color and they got the wrong guy.

You can use your common sense, ladies and gentlemen, to reject that argument. You can reject it because you know all of the evidence that points to that car being used during the robbery. Let's think about it. A dark-colored, four-door sedan, Japanese make and model, mid 1990s, a license plate ending in 7788 with two letters that Ms. Torruella remembered, Is that really so far off from Zaporia Dunbar's car? A and K. It is remarkable that she remembered that much information in the first place.

So what if the agents or the victims got the state They got the numbers right and that's what matters. Emma Torruella told you that she said that the car had an A in it. There should be no doubt in your mind that the car used during the robbery was Zaporia Dunbar's car. And you know from your common sense the defendant was driving that car that day.

The third stop during the day of the robbery is going to Demi's grandmother's house. Demi Torres is on the phone getting ready for bed. She was very matter of fact about what she observed on the witness stand. My mom came to the house. She had no keys. She didn't call. I was in my room. And she was banging on the door. And someone was with her that was unknown. I didn't know him.

You saw Demi Torres' demeanor on the stand. Did she look like someone who was making up a story to you? You also

IA4 Summation - Mr. Aravind

heard about the person in that room who kept the door open and kept avoiding eye contact.

MR. DRATEL: Objection.

THE COURT: I'll allow it.

MR. ARAVIND: While Emma Torruella went into her grandmother's bedroom and took a book bag full of \$20,000.

You heard from Barea and Torruella what happened back at 1403 Overing, and there is no real dispute about those facts.

You also heard about the aftermath of the robbery.

David Barea calls Tyrone Brown repeatedly, but can't get in touch with him. Remember these calls? This is David Barea's testimony saying he tried to call him repeatedly, and here are all the phone call contacts between David Barea and Tyrone

Brown's phone, just as Special Agent Reynolds laid out for you. He's upset. He has a suspicion that Brown has set him up. He wants to confront him. He calls him and calls him and calls him. And what does Brown do? He calls his buddy, Antione

Chambers, that 6130 number, on March 26 at 10:53 a.m. his partner in crime.

Let's talk a little bit about the cell site evidence.

The cell side evidence corroborates the narrative of that evening. It shows that the defendant was involved. That evidence is devastating, ladies and gentlemen.

And just to be clear, there should be no question in

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your mind that that 6130 number that was Twizzie's number on Brown's iPhone was right at 1338 Croes Avenue right at the time of the robbery, right around 1 am. You heard that from Special Agent Eric Perry, the cell site guy. The phone was there.

What did he show you? Here is the map that he showed There is 1338 Croes Avenue, where the A is. And you can see six phone calls from 12:13 to 1:16 a.m., right as that robbery is about to begin.

Then he showed you the movement of that cell phone. The first call is at 120, cell tower 120 and then the phone goes up to cell tower 90, which is near Zaporia Dunbar's apartment on Barnes Avenue.

You also heard a lot of testimony about the investigation in this case. You heard testimony, you saw evidence related to that investigation by the NYPD and the FBI. You heard that because the defendant and his robbery crew were professionals. They didn't leave a trace at the scene. And so you heard that the NYPD and the FBI had to piece together the story of what happened that day from the victims and from information that the victims provided. There are two critical pieces of that puzzle, the Honda Accord and the phone evidence.

Let's take a minute to talk about those. You heard that the agents found that Honda Accord right outside the defendant's apartment on May 23, 2013. You heard that the agents learn about 4782 Barnes Avenue through that 911 call

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that was placed by another one of Antione Chambers' phone numbers. You heard about Detective Deloren and Special Agent Reynolds going to that location and Detective Deloren saying that he nearly jumped out of his seat when he saw that car, a dark-colored Honda Accord with a license plate that nearly matched the license plate given by David Barea and Emma Torruella.

They ran that plate, AKW-7788, and the plate came back to Zaporia Dunbar. That is part of that Department of Motor Vehicles stipulation. They conducted surveillance of the car and saw Zaporia Dunbar in that car. They were able to establish the relationship between the car and Dunbar.

The next step was finding out Dunbar and Antione Chambers. And systematically, step by step, they were able to Special Agent Reynolds walked you through that testimony yesterday. You heard about the birth certificate. You heard about how they conducted surveillance and were able to make the purchases.

You also heard about, four days later, that car sustained major damage during a car accident. Officer Whelan told you that he was following that car on White Plains Road when it committed several traffic violations. He got a good look at the person and then the car sped off, causing an accident near the defendant's residence, four days after Special Agent Reynolds and Detective Deloren first went out to

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Barnes Avenue.

Here is a map of where Zaporia Dunbar's apartment is, 4782 Barnes Avenue, very close to where that accident took You heard that the Honda Accord was involved in an accident and the driver, a black male, fled the scene.

You also heard that when Detective Deloren went to find the Honda in that impound lot, he found this hammer. And that's Government Exhibit 500. That same hammer was shown to David Barea, who identified it as the hammer that was used repeatedly by the defendant to hit him on the legs when Barea was not forthcoming enough to tell him where the money was.

Based on all of that evidence related to the car, is there any doubt that the Honda Accord with the license plate AKW-7788, used by the defendant, Antione Chambers, when he drove Emma Torruella to Emma's mother's house to get that bag There should be no doubt in your mind once you make all the connections and use your common sense.

What about that hammer. When the defendant was arrested, he told Special Agent Reynolds that it was just one of the tools when he worked on his houses. But Detective Deloren told you he found no other tools in that regard when it was found.

Before we begin, I expect defense counsel is going to stand up and say that there was no way that 6130 number can be connected with Antione Chambers. Why does he have to make that

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argument? Because the objective phone evidence is so devastating. And you know that argument isn't true, ladies and gentlemen. Why? Because the evidence shows that the user of that 6130 phone is Twizzie, and you know that Twizzie is Antione Chambers.

Let's go through the evidence. Tyrone Brown's iPhone. There is the Twizzie home number, 717-743-6130. That's the Twizzie phone that we got the cell sites for. Who else told you that Antione Chambers was Twizzie?

You heard from Kentrell Ferguson. Kentrell Ferguson was an interesting witness. He didn't want to be here. But he showed up in a suit and he didn't want to tell you about Antione Chambers. But he did tell you about him anyway. said his nickname first was Twin and then admitted that the nickname was Twizzie in his phone. That's that cracked cell phone screen that we looked at. Twizzie, with four other numbers associated with it.

How else do you know that Antione Chambers is Twizzie? Because the investigation that the agents did after finding out about the contacts between the Tyrone Brown phone and Twizzie's phone right before the robbery. You heard from Special Agent Reynolds. He looked through Brown's phone, found that contact, saw that number and then made all the connections, the subpoenas, the public records, like the birth certificate and the DMV records. He was able to establish that Twizzie was the

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man who lived at 4782 Barnes Avenue and was the father of Dunbar's child; this man, Antione Chambers.

Now, you just heard from Judge Schofield that if you find the defendant attempted to evade arrest by fleeing, you may, but are not required to infer that the defendant believed he was quilty for the crimes for which he is here today. submit that is exactly the inference that you should draw from the evidence about the defendant's flight.

What happens after the robbery? The first thing that happens after the robbery is the day afterwards, when the defendant gets out of town. He gets a call from Tyrone Brown and later that day he leaves the area, and that's what Special Agent Perry's slide showed. March 26, the day after the robbery, the phone travels from New York to the vicinity of Lebanon, Pennsylvania.

What happens the day after Brown is arrested? Brown is arrested on May 8, 2013. And by that time the defendant is no longer in the New York area. What did Special Agent Perry say? Do you see any records from April 4 to April 30 referencing a cell tower in New York? Answer: I do not.

In fact, ladies and gentlemen, you should take a look at the cell site records that day. All of this evidence is before you and you can take a look at it during your deliberations. This is in evidence as Government Exhibit 160B, which is the cell sites for the Twizzie 6130 phone.

What was the last day that was used to make an outgoing call? The last day, if you look at the records, is April 8, 2013, the same day that Tyrone Brown is arrested. Is that a coincidence, ladies and gentlemen, or does that mean that the police are circling and the defendant wants to get rid of himself, any of his ties to his coconspirators? Your common sense tells you, this is the defendant who told David Barea not to look at him during the robbery. This is the defendant who didn't want to show his face to Demi Torres. This is the defendant who wanted to eliminate his connection to Tyrone Brown, so he dropped his phone.

And what happens when the agents start focusing on Chambers? Let's go through the events on May 23. They go see Zaporia Dunbar, see that Accord. They look for the defendant. They can't find him. A week later they go look and try again. They speak to more people. And no one knows where the defendant is. Why? Because the defendant has gone underground. And what do Zaporia Dunbar's records reflect? Isaac Nelson: When she left, did you try and contact her? Yes, I did. Were you successful? No. I called her and then she didn't answer her phone. It wasn't working.

What did Special Agent Perry tell you about Zaporia Dunbar's records? As reflected in this exhibit, that there are no more outgoing calls after that day. Like the defendant, she drops her phone.

Isaac Nelson doesn't have any skin in this game, ladies and gentlemen. He's just a normal guy who came here and testified and told you exactly what happened. And then you finally heard from Sergeant DeRosa, who stopped the defendant while he was driving a rental car not in his own name, and he was found with a fake driver's license. This is the license and the name Jerome Adams and that, ladies and gentlemen, is the defendant.

Take a look at that picture, ladies and gentlemen. Defense counsel has never challenged that this is a picture of Antione Chambers, the defendant. You should look at all of the photographs that are in evidence. And I submit to you that the only inference that can be drawn from this fact that the defendant was found in a different state with a fake ID in a car that was not his own and that he repeatedly refused to give his name to Sergeant DeRosa. What's the inference? He is trying to hide his tracks. He knows the cops are after him and he doesn't want to get caught.

Before I sit down, ladies and gentlemen, I want to talk briefly about the charges. You have just heard them now, so I am not going to belabor them. You have Count One, which is the robbery conspiracy count. And there is no question there was a robbery conspiracy here to rob Mr. Barea of his money from the drug business. You heard repeatedly there are two robbers working together to rob them this morning. You

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also know that interstate commerce element that the judge just told you was effective. Judge Schofield just instructed you, the government only needs to show you a minimal or subtle or potential effect. Did we show that to you here? Absolutely. You heard from Mr. Barea the defendant stole money that he had saved up in part from his drug business, his cocaine dealing business. And you saw a stipulation that said that cocaine is not manufactured in New York State. That's interstate commerce right there.

Count Two is the robbery.

Count Three is the kidnapping. And on this point I just want to talk about the fact, the undisputed fact that the interstate commerce, the means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce, which is a big way of saying, was a phone used during the kidnapping. Ladies and gentlemen, you know that a phone was used during the kidnapping. We have shown it to you repeatedly.

Count Four charges the defendant with possessing, using, or carrying a firearm that was brandished during the March 25, 2013 robbery. Was the gun brandished and used during the robbery? Of course it was. You heard from Mr. Barea and Ms. Torruella about how the defendant held a gun -- how a gun with a potato was pointed during the robbery. You also heard from David Barea that Antione Chambers had another gun that he kept on his waist.

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One of the things that I have tried to stress this afternoon is how all of the evidence supports each other and how it all points in one direction, there, to the defendant, Antione Chambers. The testimony of the witnesses, the physical evidence, the photographs, they all tell you the same thing. Antione Chambers committed a vicious, brutal armed robbery and 7 kidnapping on March 23, 2013. You heard the violence and the force that this defendant committed against Mr. Barea and Ms. Torruella. That evidence, combined with the objective evidence, the phone records, the cell site records, the evidence about the car, the fake driver's license, all of that other evidence supports the testimony and tells you that Antione Chambers is quilty. The setup call from Brown to 14 initiate the robbery. The cell site location evidence that shows that he was there. The fact that he drops his phone and skips town once he knows the feds are on him. I am going to sit down now. And after Mr. Dratel speaks we will have an opportunity to speak to you again. I submit to you that when you consider the testimony and all of 19 the evidence you have heard and seen, the only just and fair

view, the only view that makes sense here and is supported by the evidence is that the defendant is quilty. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Dratel.

MR. DRATEL: Thank you.

It's not him. Wow. Powerful, dramatic, genuine,

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honest. It's not him. She said it twice. Not during cross-examination. Not under pressure of cross-examination. When the Assistant United States Attorney was questioning her. Breakdown. She couldn't do the wrong thing.

I don't even know if I even have to say anymore. I don't think I should have to say anymore than what you saw on that witness stand from Ms. Torruella. But I am going to because I couldn't leave a stone unturned here. That's more than enough reasonable doubt. That is the definition of reasonable doubt, the person with the longest, with the best, with the closest look, without a mask, at the second robber got on the witness stand and said, it's not him. Teardrop tattoo. It's not him. She said the features were different. explained it. That's the only ID witness that's in this case. It's not him.

Page 215 of the transcript. She was traumatized by that robbery, no question. She suffered at the hands of those robbers. Imagine the anger. You could see it. You could see the impact that it had on her. You can see it in Mr. Barea as She want here to exonerate Mr. Chambers. She was here to put that robber away for as long as possible, but she couldn't do the wrong thing. And she exonerated Mr. Chambers. There is only one reason. It's not him. No amount of cell phone records that have no content whatsoever. The only person in this case who has testified about any phone conversations is

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Summation - Mr. Dratel

the Assistant United States Attorney during the past 45 minutes. You can scour the entire record. That's not That's not evidence. It's not him. That's testimony. evidence. None of it can overcome that.

I want to thank you for paying attention. I want to thank you for being here. This is my last opportunity to speak to you, so I feel I have to take advantage of it and go through the evidence as a whole as well.

Now, there is no identification of Mr. Chambers as the second robber in this case. In the opening I told you you are going to see identifications. There is no identification of Mr. Chambers as the robber in this case. I told you they were tainted. Now they don't exist at all.

Eleven witnesses. Not a single one. By the way, not a single one had any connection of Mr. Chambers to the robbery. Not a single one even knows Mr. Chambers except for Kentrell Ferguson, who says his nickname is Twin. He was their witness.

There is a lot more reasonable doubt. I'm not asking you for inferences, to pile on speculation upon speculation, making up conversations that you don't know what was in them, making up, connecting someone to something without any evidence. In my head, no. Dispositive reasonable doubt from the witness stand.

Start with David Barea, detail, devastating detail. It is. For Mr. Chambers' benefit. Teardrop tattoo on the

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second robber, just like Ms. Torruella told you. He spent a lot of time on Mr. Barea's testimony. Left that out.

Mr. Barea said the second robber was a little taller than Mr. Barea, who is five-six, not seven inches taller.

The car. From both Ms. Torruella and Mr. Barea, independently and separately. Remember she said they didn't talk about it. They were instructed not to talk about it. Both of them said an Acura. Both of them said black or dark green, New York plate. They said a bunch of different colors: Black, dark green, dark black, flat black; never blue. And Mr. Barea knows colors on cars because we heard, when he talked about seeing Tyrone Brown in a midnight blue Impala. He knows the difference. Make, model, color, year, plates, all different than that Honda that caused Detective Deloren to jump out of his seat. We will talk about that some more in a little bit.

Detective Deloren, you heard him testify that he even wrote a memo and sent it out to people with a picture of an Acura, a '97, '98 Acura describing it with details, partial New York plate, '97, '98 year. Do we have any evidence that they even checked New York plates to see if there was a similar car? Agent Reynolds said, they are not always right about cars. about numbers? Maybe they are a number off. Maybe. Maybe she didn't see it as detailed as she thought she might have. That didn't occur to them to check New York plates

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to see if there was a car, an Acura that possibly matched They had it in their head. something like that. No.

You heard the Assistant United States Attorney say they were careful, so careful that the second robber in the car, sitting next to her in the passenger's seat -- by the way, she is in the car, in the passenger's seat. No hoodie, no nothing. She has got a chance to examine that care on the way to her mother's house and on the way back. She didn't waffle on the Acura part. And you heard from even Detective Deloren, from his notes, Acura, not possible Acura.

But she said the tall guy wasn't worried about the examining the license plate. You remember? It was the other guy. They don't even know it was Mr. Chambers. Light skinned, speaking Spanish. He is the one who was worried about examining the license plate. The tall guy took his mask off and says, I don't care. I'm from Brooklyn. That's what she told you. How is that for careful.

The car. I got to say, imagine, you can be in one of two situations. You can be the employee, the employer, you can be both, you can be in the middle. Imagine if you were tasked as the employee or you were the employer tasking the employee and said, I have a request. Please find me a specific car, a specific make and model from a specific year and a specific color with New York plates. An Acura, '97, '98. I would like it to be black or midnight green. I want it to have New York

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plates. I want it to be '97, '98. I may have said that And the employee comes back with a Honda Accord alreadv. that's blue with North Carolina plates from '95. How do you think that employee review is going to go?

Just to prove it, they had all those photos they would They didn't even show them on the witness stand or show you. They never showed that blue Honda to Ms. Torruella any time. or Mr. Barea. And you know why? Talk about the Honda. Mr. Chambers, when he was taken back from New Jersey, told Agent Reynolds in the car that Ms. Dunbar wouldn't let him drive the Honda. And you know that's true.

How do you know that's true? Another piece of evidence the government put in. The government put in. Remember the 911 call, February 1, 2013, five or six weeks before the robbery. Somebody named Antione calls an ambulance. That's the same day, by the way, that him and Zaporia Dunbar's child was born, February 1, 2013, February 2. She went into labor and they called the ambulance. You think if he was allowed to drive the car they are waiting for an ambulance? They are in that Honda on the way to the hospital. You all know that from your common sense.

As I said in opening, circumstantial evidence goes both ways. That's all you've got and it's weak, doesn't connect, and it doesn't matter because you heard the witnesses. David Barea, he never identifies the second robber except for

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the teardrop tattoo. Ms. Torruella has a teardrop tattoo on that second robber, too. Didn't hear a word about that in the government's summation. Maybe they will come back with something. Who knows what they will come back with. I won't be able to talk to you again about it. I will talk to you about that process, too.

By the way, in that conversation on the way back from New Jersey everything that Mr. Chambers told him was true, that you can try to verify this. He knew Glisson. He didn't say I don't know Glisson, I don't know Brown. He said he knew them. He said he made the 911 call. He said he was the father of Ms. Dunbar's child.

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MR. DRATEL: Not true.

The Honda accident, there's no evidence it was Mr. Chambers driving the car. You heard Mr. Whelan. He looked in the car. He saw the driver. Deer in the headlights. Was he asked to identify? No. Did he have any identification? No. So it was 5'10". That's the only description: Black male 5'10". Really? Really? This is what they want you to pile on top of each other to get nowhere. It collapses. Every time you put another piece on, it collapses.

I asked Detective Deloren about confirmation bias, confirmation bias being the tendency to interpret --

MR. ARAVIND: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MR. DRATEL: This case is about trying over and over again and pounding a square peg into a round hole in which it does not fit.

Now, the hammer, you couldn't find a more generic hammer. I could have bought that at a hardware store yesterday and brought it in. It looked the same. No DNA. Did they check it for fingerprints maybe? No. Nothing. You know why. You saw Detective Deloren. You know why. You know what this investigation was about. This was about him jumping out of his seat making up his mind right there.

The assistant United States Attorney's summation said you know it was used during the robbery. You know this is the

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hammer. How? How? There is no evidence that that hammer has anything to do with this robbery. The only testimony -- there's no testimony. The only time it comes in from him. Even Mr. Barea said it looks like the hammer.

course it looks like the hammer. It looks like every hammer.

By the way, he's shown him the hammer two months after the robbery. The car, the Honda parked on the street on Barnes Avenue, wide open. No intention to hide, do anything. By the way, talk about this investigation: They knew that Zaporia Dunbar lived in North Carolina. Did they follow up with her? She didn't answer the landlord's calls. She owed him money. She moved to North Carolina. Maybe that's the reason, but I'm not going to ask you to speculate. I'm going to ask you to demand evidence, demand proof. Don't let a lawyer put in your head a theory that doesn't fit what you heard from the witness stand.

The New Jersey arrest: It's an hour from New York. He's with Ms. Dunbar and the kids. That's not much flight four months after the event. The phoney license: No telling when he had it. No telling if he ever had a license in any state, what the status of his license was, or why he has a phoney license. That's nothing. It's a series of hollow, insupportable inferences piled on each other getting you nowhere.

Also, as the judge instructed you, even if you think

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that that's some kind of inference that you can draw, it alone is not sufficient for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Phone records: No content. All those messages going back and forth, it's from him. I don't recall anybody, there's no paper, there's no person, there's no evidence, there's no testimony. There's nothing. That's speculation. That's not even proof, much less beyond a reasonable doubt. Pure speculation.

Compare that speculation with the testimony of Ms. Torruella, "It's not him;" with Mr. Barea, "teardrop tattoo, " go ahead and compare. It's easy.

Also the phone, there's no connection -- they don't have any proof putting that phone in Mr. Chambers' hands during this whole period. We don't know who has that the phone. don't know about those contacts. We don't know what they mean. No one explained them. No one knows if the phone is shared, borrowed. Nobody knows this. There's no proof. There's also other phone calls during that period, texts right around the time that Mr. Barea shows up. In fact, you'll see some of the communications with Mr. Barea are followed -- were preceded by a whole other number, which is a lot of calls. Who knows? You can't just make it up and fit it in, pound that square peg into that round hole. You can't do it.

The cell site: They wanted to make it like the 26th was something important, that he left New York, right, this

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device left New York. Well, it shows that the device went back and forth and back and forth and back and forth over the entire period well before and well after.

Now, the most common tower used was Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and half the time, that device is in Pennsylvania somewhere or in the corridor between New York and Pennsylvania if you look at that arc. Did they put Mr. Chambers there at any point during that period? Do you think they might have investigated it? No, they made up their minds. Detective Deloren jumped out of his seat and that was it. He liked that car.

And then, by the way, after the 26th, it turns out the device is back in the Bronx on the 27th, the 28th, the 29th. There's no connection between the device leaving on the 26th and the robbery. Those are not valid inferences. These are what I would call digital diversions that we're capable of now because everything is monitored and tracked and records of everything. You can put together something that can show anything with this kind of evidence. So much information.

What you really need is proof. You need something from the witness stand that will tell you what happened in this case, and you heard them. Would you want to be judged on the standard of proof?

Remember the judge's reasonable doubt instruction: Something important in your own life that would cause you to

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hesitate. Is that what you would want to be judged on? Loved ones, would you want them to be judged on that standard, or on the standard of the victim of a robbery who comes in here and tells you it's not him.

The call from the Metropolitan Detention Center where there's something unintelligible and it says "My man Twiz." I don't know about you, but I'd never refer to myself by my name after I said "my man." That's usually referring to someone else. Think about that. Think about the syntax. Doesn't make sense, common sense. Your every day experience applies.

It says identify yourself, the prompt says identify yourself and then there's unintelligible and then it says "My man Twiz." Figure it out.

Certainly can't draw a conclusion from that. You just don't know. That's proof beyond a reasonable doubt. You could pile that a pile high. It's not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. By the way, there are 81 other calls during that time period. There are hundreds of emails during that time period. It's the only reference we see. That doesn't tell you anything.

You heard a lot of instructions about the law and just remember the government says that he was that second robber. It's not an aiding and abetting case. They say he's there. They say he's in it. They say he's the guy.

Detective Deloren, the stipulation, the Government

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Exhibit 2007, tried to throw them under the bus: I told everybody about that photo. No. Didn't. You heard that in another case, he testified and the judge found for the defendant despite his testimony at a hearing, not a trial.

Remember Ms. Torruella's testimony. She was shown that second photo array and he told her forget about the teardrop and then he denied it. Who do you believe? it's an easy one. "Forget about the teardrop." What does that tell you? Nobody's interested in this case. She never wavered from the fact that the second robber had a teardrop tattoo. David Barea said the same thing. And he said forget about the teardrop. He liked that car, and he jumped out of his seat. Game over.

He thought game over for Mr. Chambers when he got Ms. Torruella to pick him out of an array, but she could not do the wrong thing. He wasn't depending on that, and he wasn't depending on you. He didn't know that you would hear that and you would be here to do your duty.

DNA, none on the duct tape. Now, they said they were wearing gloves, but we don't know when the duct tape was bought, handled, we don't know any of that. And also there is DNA on that duct tape. There are two DNA samples -- there are two persons on that duct tape, DNA from two people. The only one we know for sure it's not is Mr. Chambers.

They took samples from Ms. Torruella and Mr. Barea.

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They took samples in March of 2013, the day of -- the day of the robbery March 25. They never tested them. I think they were worried about the answer that they would be on there, and then we'd have two robbers. They didn't test Glisson. didn't test anybody. They didn't test Chambers 'til last week. Think about it. Think about this case. Think about this investigation. "I liked that car." That's what this investigation was all about.

Think about when Mr. Chambers was arrested in New Jersey. Did you hear about anything that was recovered from him that is any way connected to this crime. When they arrested Glisson, he had ammo. He had magazines for weapons, not I don't mean reading magazines, I mean clips. Tyrone Brown had drugs and a scale. By the way, I don't remember anybody saying Tyrone Brown was a coconspirator. I don't remember any testimony that said that Tyrone Brown was in on the robbery. It's just from him. There's no witness who said that. So the only reason those phone calls could make any sense is if that's the case, but you don't have any evidence. Speculation; not evidence. Nothing about Mr. Chambers, nothing recovered from him that has anything to do with this robbery, no spending, no money, no nothing.

As I said, this will be the last time I'll get a chance to talk to you. I'm going to ask you that when Ms. Tekeei gets up to do a rebuttal, which I will not be able

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to respond to, that you take that responsibility and you say to yourself, Ms. Tekeei, what about Ms. Torruella's testimony? What about Mr. Barea's testimony? What about the complete lack of any evidence to support your theory? What about Detective Deloren? What about the car? What about the teardrop? What about "It's not him"? What about the DNA? What about all this?

That is reasonable doubt. There's enough reasonable doubt, one for each of you. You only need one among you. I said in the opening statement that I was confident that after hearing the evidence, and the lack of evidence, that you would find Mr. Chambers not guilty on all the charges. The trial has only reinforced that conclusion. Your common sense reinforces that conclusion.

You've had the privilege here of seeing something very special. You could sit through a thousand trials and not see what you saw here: The truth flowing out of someone unstoppable, like her tears, inexorable, more powerful than Detective Deloren's manipulation poisoning this investigation, more powerful than any sterile evidence, without support.

She refused to do the wrong thing. It was moving. was courageous. It was authentic. It was really all you need to decide this case, but there is so much more, but it's all vou need.

I can still hear her sobbing. I can still hear her

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voice, the raw emotion, the raw honesty. I won't describe it any more because I won't bother because I assume you can still hear it vourselves. "It's not him."

Thank you.

THE COURT: Ms. Tekeei.

MS. TEKEEI: Thank you, your Honor.

First, I want to be very clear about something: Torruella testified the very first day of this trial. She sat there in that witness stand and she looked around the courtroom carefully and she told you unequivocally that the man sitting at that table, Antione Chambers, the defendant, was the man who kidnapped her on March 25, 2013. And then she sat there and she told you, complete strangers, what had happened to her.

She told you how she saw the father of her son bloody, hands tied behind his back, how the defendant beat him with a hammer, how they threatened him with a gun. She told you how the defendant grabbed her by the neck, how he forced her into a car, how he told her she was pretty, how she thought she was going to be raped, killed.

She told you how she was forced to take the defendant into her mother's apartment, how she tried to persuade her daughter that everything was fine, how her son, David's son, was sleeping in that apartment, and she told you how the defendant took the money, forced her back home, how he tied up her hands and made her kneel to the floor, how he then made her

lay faced down on her bed. She told you all of these things and all the while, she glanced at that man.

We were here. She looked over at him, her kidnapper, the man who had done all of these horrible things and she was confronted with a picture of him on that witness stand. She had him looking up at her from the table, and she had that picture in front of her, and she had him staring at that table --

MR. DRATEL: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

MS. TEKEEI: And we all saw what happened: She fell apart, she completely fell apart. And who wouldn't?

Ladies and gentlemen, we have all seen the defendant throughout this trial and we looked at many pictures of him, not just the pictures in the photo array, but also the very picture that he provided on his fake ID. Look at the man sitting here today. Look at the pictures of him. Emma Torruella did.

First she said that is the man who kidnapped me that night. She had picked him out, Antione Chambers, out of a photo array nine weeks after he kidnapped her and robbed and violently attacked her husband; and sitting here on Monday, after she looked him in the eyes and told you the defendant was her kidnapper, she fell apart. And with this photo array picture that nobody disputes is the defendant in front of her

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she broke down and she compared them. We all saw that happen. People's appearances change.

And you heard about that teardrop tattoo, the one Steven Glisson had. How easy would it be to confuse the teardrop, to think that both of your robbers --

MR. DRATEL: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MS. TEKEEI: How easy would it be for her to have confused that and thought that the two people who committed these violent acts both had a teardrop tattoo?

This afternoon you heard several arguments from Mr. Dratel on behalf of his client. As you know, though, there is a critical difference between argument and evidence. And argument is only as good as the facts and the evidence on which it is based; and what Mr. Dratel provided you was argument and an invitation to speculate.

What we have presented to you, and what we think you should be focused on when you go back and deliberate, is the evidence, the facts and the reasonable inferences that you can draw from the facts.

And why is this so important? Because much of what you heard from the defense was designed to distract you from the evidence and the facts that you should be considering.

Ladies and gentlemen, at the beginning of this trial, I told you that this case was not going to be like a television

show that you might watch, but I was wrong. There were some dramatic moments, but that's also what happens in real life; and that's how you know that when David and Emma took the stand and told you what happened to them, they were being brave; and that's how you know that the defendant was one of the men who

robbed and kidnapped them that night.

In his opening, and in his closing statements, defense counsel tried to minimize Emma Torruella's identification of a defendant from a photo array in which she circled his picture and signed his name nine weeks after the robbery.

The compelling phone evidence in this case showing you that the defendant Antione "Twizzie" Chambers was intricately involved this the robbery and kidnapping that night. The indisputable evidence regarding the car that the defendant and his coconspirators used the night of the robbery, his girlfriend's car, the one that was parked outside of their apartment when the agents, who had no idea at that time who Antione Chambers was or that he even existed, went to try to interview the residents of 4782 Barnes Avenue.

When you consider carefully the evidence in this case, you can see why the defense would try to distract you, because if you focus on the facts and the evidence, all the details are there, it's clear that the defendant is guilty. Antione Chambers is Twizzie. Kentrell Ferguson told you that. He tried not to, but he ultimately admitted that Antione Chambers,

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the man sitting there, is Twizzie.

Tyrone Brown's first call after David Barea called him the night of the robbery to tell him he was on his way over; Twizzie, the owner of the phone that happens to be located at the robbery location during the time of the robbery, during the time of the kidnapping, and then after the robbery and kidnapping are all over, he goes back to 4782 Barnes Avenue. Indisputable.

MR. DRATEL: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MS. TEKEEI: The apartment where Antione Chambers lived, and you heard that from the landlord Isaac Nelson who has nothing to do with this case, you heard him tell you about where Chambers lived.

Twizzie, Tyrone Brown's first call after Detective Deloren, investigating the robbery, called Brown to interview him; the number that after Brown's arrest on April 8, 2013 stops being used; and then Twizzie, the defendant, is stopped in New Jersey with a fake driver's license and refuses to give his real name.

Antione "Twizzie" Chambers must be the unluckiest man in the world. His phone, his girlfriend's car, his fake driver's license, his refusal to give his real name when he knows the authorities are looking for him, ladies and gentlemen, Antione "Twizzie" Chambers was one of the robbers

that night, and you know this because the indisputable evidence tells you that.

Now, Mr. Dratel spent some time trying to tell you that the NYPD was targeting the defendant. That is not true. How do you know that? Because it was good old-fashioned police work. Here's what you learned from Special Agent Reynolds and Detective Deloren: After the robbery and kidnapping, they responded to the location where the robbery started, Tyrone Brown's apartment, 1338 Croes Avenue.

They found video surveillance that showed them exactly what David Barea had told them happened: Two men covered from head to toe to finger rushed him as he was leaving Brown's apartment, attacked him, let him out with his hands tied behind his back, shoved him into a car. And they got a description of that car: A dark-colored sedan, possibly an Acura, four doors, license sequence at least ending in 7788.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, we heard a lot about that car today. Look back at the picture of that car in your exhibits binder. Is it black? Is it midnight blue? How can you tell? It is dark. It is dark, dark, dark, and that is what the victims told the detectives that night.

They arrested Brown and what did they get? Two phones. And when they looked at those phones, guess what they found? Guess who Tyrone Brown, the tipster, called immediately after talking to David Barea the night of the robbery?

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Twizzie; the only number that Brown communicated with extensively that night leading up to the robbery and kidnapping.

And then what did the agents and the detectives do? They began to research all of the phone numbers on those phones for Twizzie and you saw them, there were three of them, and one of them matched the same number Kentrell Ferguson had for Twizzie for Antione Chambers.

MR. DRATEL: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

MS. TEKEEI: Guess what they found. One of those numbers had been used by a man who called himself Antione when he called 9-1-1 and gave an address, 4782 Barnes Avenue. And then they went to that address, old-fashioned police work, and what did they find?

They found a car, the very car that had been used in the robbery, six out of seven of the license plate sequence numbers matched the numbers and sequence that the victims had given.

Was it a Honda? Was it an Acura? New York plates? North Carolina plates? It does not matter. Six out of the seven license sequence matched.

So what happened next? They did surveillance. They saw a woman Zaporia Dunbar driving that car. They didn't know who she was. They didn't know anything about

her. But they learned her son's name and what did they do?

They subpoenaed records to find out who her son's father was.

Antione, Antione Chambers. And they kept investigating

Twizzie's phones. Mr. Aravind went through this extensively.

And what does the 6130 Twizzie phone do a week before the robbery when David Barea shows up to Tyrone Brown's house, and then the very night of the robbery minutes, before and after David Barea is at Brown's apartment? It's there: 1338 Croes Avenue. Special Agent Eric Perry told you that. That is not a coincidence, ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. Dratel spent some time trying to convince you that there's no hard evidence tieing Mr. Chambers to the scene.

That's because this was a professional job. They were covered from head to toe.

Why is there no DNA evidence tieing Mr. Chambers to that duct tape? Because he was wearing gloves. You heard David Barea tell you that. You heard Emma Torruella tell you that.

Why did he tell Emma he was from Brooklyn? Because he wanted to take his mask off, because he was trying to throw her off. And it's true: He did take that mask off. He made that mistake, and that's why we're here today, because he never expected that someone would be able to describe him, to pick him out of a photo array nine weeks after the incident, nine weeks after being robbed and kidnapped.

Ladies and gentlemen, over the past week, because of the careful attention you have paid to the evidence in this case, the defendant has received a fair trial. He has had his day in court.

Judge Schofield has instructed you on the law and when we sit down, it will be time for you to go into the jury room and do your duty, to decide this case without bias or fear or prejudice or sympathy, but based solely on the facts and the evidence.

We urge you again to do that: Focus on the evidence, follow the judge's instructions, and, most of all, to use your common sense. Use your common sense when you evaluate what you saw and what you heard from the witnesses on the stand, when you think about how difficult it is to come into this courtroom, how difficult it was for her to talk about the serious night of her life, to walk you through her nightmare, the night she thought she was going to die.

If you do those things, there is only one verdict you can return that is consistent with the evidence and reflects the truth of what the defendant did, that the defendant is guilty.

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes the lawyers' arguments. You have now heard all the evidence and all the arguments.

I have just a couple minutes of final instructions to

give you and then you can adjourn to the jury room and begin your deliberations.

You're about to go into the jury room and begin doing that, and you are to conduct your duty as jurors in an atmosphere of complete fairness and impartiality, without bias for or against the government or the defendant.

I don't think you really need to follow along on this, but you can if you want.

You're not to consider what the reaction of the parties or the public to your verdict will be, whether it will please or displease anyone, be popular or unpopular, or, indeed, any consideration outside the case as it has been presented to you in the courtroom.

You should find the facts from what you consider to be believable evidence and apply the law as I gave it to you.

Your verdict will be determined by the conclusion you reach, no matter whom the verdict helps or hurts.

For the same reason, the personality and conduct of any attorney is not in any way at issue. If you formed opinions of any kind as to those matters, they should not enter into your deliberations.

The first thing you should do when you enter the jury room is you should elect one member of the jury as your foreperson. The person will preside over the deliberations and speak for you here in open court.

The foreperson has no greater voice or authority than any other juror. The foreperson will send out notes and when the jury has reached a verdict, he or she will notify

Mr. Street that the jury has reached a verdict.

You each have a copy of most of the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence. The only exhibits that are missing are voluminous exhibits.

You also have your notebooks, your own notes, you have my jury instructions. You should feel free to refer to any of those during your deliberations.

If you want any of the testimony read back to you, you may request that. Please remember that when you request testimony, the lawyers must agree on what portions may be called for; and if they disagree, I must rule on and resolve those disagreements. That can be a time-consuming process, so please try to be as specific as you possibly can in requesting any portion of testimony.

Your requests for testimony, in fact, any communication with the Court should be made to me in writing signed by the foreperson and then given to Mr. Street in an envelope. In any event, do not tell me or anyone how the jury stands on any issue until a verdict is reached.

The most important part of the case is the part that you, as jurors, are now about to play as you deliberate on the issues of fact. It is for you, and you alone, to decide

whether the government has sustained its burden of proof as I have explained it to you with respect to each charge against the defendant.

If you find the government has met its burden of proof on a particular charge, you must find the defendant guilty on that charge.

If you find the government has failed to meet its burden on any element of a charge, you must find the defendant not guilty of that charge.

I know you will try the issues that have been presented to you according to the oath that you have given as jurors. In that oath, you promised you would well and truly try the issues joined in this case and render a true verdict.

It is your duty as jurors to consult with each other and to deliberate with a view to reaching agreement. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but you should do so only after consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. Moreover, you should not hesitate to change an opinion when convinced that it is wrong.

Every juror should be heard. No one juror should hold center stage in the jury room. No one juror should control or monopolize the deliberations.

Your verdict must be unanimous, but you are not bound to surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of the evidence for the mere purpose of returning a

verdict or solely because of the opinion of other jurors.

Discuss and weigh your respective opinions dispassionately, without regard to sympathy, without regard to prejudice or favor of either party, and adopt the conclusion that in your good conscious appears to be in accordance with the truth.

Again, each of you must make your own decision about the proper outcome of the case based on your consideration of the evidence and your discussion with fellow jurors. No juror should surrender his or her conscientious beliefs solely for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict.

We have a verdict form for you. Mr. Street, maybe you can pass it out while I finish.

The purpose of the form is to help us - the Court, the attorneys, the defendant - to understand what your findings are. No inference is to be drawn from the way the questions are worded as to what the answers should be, and the questions are not to be taken as any indication that I have any opinion how they should be answered. I have no opinion and even if I did, it would not be binding on you.

You should answer every question unless you are directed to skip certain questions. You should also proceed to the questions in the order in which they're listed.

After you have reached a verdict, the foreperson should fill in the verdict sheet, sign and date it, and then

give a note to the deputy stating that you've reached a verdict.

Do not specify what the verdict is in your notes.

Again, just so it's clear, there should be one verdict sheet filled out at the end of your deliberations.

When you have reached a verdict, you should tell
Mr. Street in a written note from the foreperson and do not say
what the verdict is, and then you can bring it with you into
the courtroom.

I'll stress that each of you must be in agreement with the verdict that is announced in court. Once your verdict is announced by the foreperson in open court and officially recorded, it cannot ordinarily be revoked; and I will ask you one by one if that is your verdict.

I remind you that you took an oath to render judgment impartially and fairly without prejudice or sympathy and without fear solely upon the evidence in the case and the applicable law. Your oath sums up your duty. I know you will do your duty and reach a just and true verdict.

Finally, I say this not because I think it's necessary, but because it's a custom in this courthouse: You should treat each other with courtesy and respect during your deliberations.

All litigants stand equal in this room. All litigants stand equal before the bar of justice. Your duty is to decide

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between those parties fairly and impartially to see that
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      justice is done, all in accordance with your oath as jurors.
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               Mr. Street.
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               (Marshal sworn)
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               THE DEPUTY CLERK: Jurors, you're in the hands of the
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     marshal.
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               (At 2:44 p.m., the jury retired to deliberate)
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               THE DEPUTY CLERK: Juror numbers 13 and 14, you're
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      going to come with me.
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               (Alternate jurors excused)
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               THE COURT: Counsel, if you decide to leave the
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      courtroom, please don't go far, and please be sure that
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     Mr. Street or whoever of my staff is here has to a way to reach
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      you, okay?
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               MR. DRATEL: Thank you.
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               MR. ARAVIND: Thank you.
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               (Recess pending verdict)
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               (In open court; jurors not present; defendant not
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      present)
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               MR. DRATEL: What's the Court's practice with respect
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      to -- do you want us all assembled at 9:45 are or do they just
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      come in and start deliberating. I'll be here. I wanted to
      know what the Court likes to do.
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               THE COURT: I typically have everybody come, but if
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you have a strong preference not to do that --

1	MR. DRATEL: I'll be here at 9:45.
2	THE COURT: Does government have any preference?
3	MR. ARAVIND: We'll do whatever the Court wants.
4	THE COURT: Why don't we all gather because if they're
5	being diligent, it's nice to show them that we're here and
6	attentive and waiting for them.
7	MR. DRATEL: Obviously, the defendant will be produced
8	at 9:45 as well. Yes.
9	THE COURT: Hopefully, that will happen. They're
10	getting Mr. Chambers.
11	THE DEPUTY CLERK: Yes. He's on the way up. I closed
12	the door.
13	THE COURT: What I think I'll do is, ask them to come
14	at 9:30 and as soon as they're all here, then we'll convene.
15	Did all exhibits go back to the jury room with them,
16	the hammer and the duct tape?
17	MR. DRATEL: I don't think the duct tape.
18	MR. ARAVIND: Not the hammer or the drugs or the duct
19	tape.
20	THE COURT: Just documents.
21	MR. ARAVIND: Right.
22	THE COURT: Okay. Just curious. Thanks.
23	(Pause)
24	(In open court; all parties present)
25	(Jury present; time noted: 4:38 p.m.)

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, it's the end of the week and the end of the first day of your deliberations and we're going to break for the day. We will reconvene on Monday at our usual time. Be here at 9:30. We'll come out at 9:45, but if you're all here earlier, we will come out earlier. We will basically keep the same hours.

If you're still deliberating at lunch time on Monday, we'll bring your lunch in and you can have lunch here.

I just want to remind you, you'll be away for two days with family and friends. Please remember, don't talk about the case at all, especially now that you're in the midst of deliberations, and don't look anything up.

I wish you a good weekend. Thank you. Just one minute.

The other thing is that when you do come in, please don't start your deliberations until I bring you all out here and I know you're all here. Then I'll let you go back in the room to deliberate. Okay. Thank you.

Have a good evening. The alternates can leave. See you in the morning.

(Jurors excused)

(Alternate jurors excused)

(Adjourned to October 6, 2014 at 9:30 a.m.)

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